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Introduction

Today, “you are being watched” is not just found in Orwell’s 1984. It is a part of daily life
experienced by hundreds of millions of people around the world. The most famous example is
Britain. According to a commonly quoted statistic, around 2000 there were 4.2 million closed
circuit television (CCTV) cameras in Britain—one for every fourteen people—and a person can
be captured on over three hundred cameras each day. 1 Although this figure was doubted in a study
in 2011, which said that the number of cameras is approximately 1.85 million and the number of
times the average person is likely to be less than 70,2 even those reduced figures represents a
shocking level of surveillance. Despite a later start and more fragmented implementation, the
United States will soon face similar challenges as video surveillance systems in the United States
have grown rapidly, especially in metropolitan cities.
In Washington D.C., the seat of the nation's government and home to many critical assets, the
government adopted more than 5,200 cameras in its CCTV program in 2008.3 As of 2010, New
York City was estimated to be continuously scanning at least 1,159 public and private cameras; “it
has added 500 new cameras to subway systems in the city and has plans to add approximately
1,800 more image-capturing devices in lower and midtown Manhattan.”4 And the New York Police

SURVEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK, A REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 19 (David M. Wood ed., 2006)
(U.K.), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/02_11_06_surveillance.pdf.
2
Gerrard G, Thompson R., Two Million Cameras in the UK. CCTV IMAGE, 2011, 42(10): e2. (U.K.).
1

Aileen B. Xenakis，Washington And CCTV: It’s 2010, not 1984，42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 573, (2010), (citing
Press Release, District of Columbia, Mayor Fenty Launches VIPS Program; New System Will Consolidate City's
Closed-Circuit TV Monitoring (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.dc.gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=1273.)
4
Olivia J. Greer, No Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
589, 595 (2012), (citing Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Kelly, and
MTA Chairman Walder Activate Security Cameras Inside Times Square, Penn Station, and Grand Central Subway
3
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Department (NYPD) still wants to significantly increase that amount. 5 In the American Civil
Liberties Union’s (ACLU) report on video surveillance published in February 2011, the City of
Chicago was estimated to own or have an access to as many as 10,000 cameras.6 In 2012, an officer
in Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications acknowledged that the
Chicago police had already got access to 20,000 video feeds from public and private sources.7
Compared with the rapid implementation of video surveillance systems in the United States,
the protection of civil liberties in this field has been making little progress. In 2011, ACLU
published the report calling for a moratorium on the expansion of Chicago's camera system, as
well as pending a thorough and open review. This report also proposed new privacy rules for
regulating all cameras. But Chicago did not adopt the ACLU's core proposals. Instead, it has
installed thousands of new cameras since 2011, and plans to install more. What is worse, a new
City ordinance has granted the Mayor power to purchase and install cameras without City Council
approval or review. And a bill that would have required state and local government to disclose
their total numbers of cameras failed.8 The situation is similar in other major cities. In 2011, the
New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) brought an action against the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) under the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking
documents related to a video surveillance program in lower Manhattan initiated by the NYPD.
DHS was the defendant because the NYPD received grant funding from it. But the court did not

Stations as Part of NYPD's Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative (Sept. 20, 2010)).
5
According to the NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly, Keith Proctor, The Great Surveillance Boom, FORTUNE, April
26, 2013, http://fortune.com/2013/04/26/the-great-surveillance-boom/.
6
Adam Schwartz, Chicago's Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy,
11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 47, 48 (2013).
7
Hilton Collins, Video Camera Networks Link Real-time Partners in Crime Solving, GOVT. TECH. (Feb, 1, 2012)
(citing Ruben Madrigal, OEMC Deputy Director, for the proposition: “In all, police have access to 20,000 video
feeds from public and private sources.”), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Video-Camera-Networks-LinkReal-Time-Partners-in-Crime-Solving.html.
8
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 47-48.
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grant NYCLU’s request, instead holding that the information about the numbers and name of assets
was not subject to disclosure under FOIA exemption 7(E).9
Does it really matter that we are being watched in the public places without knowing who is
behind the cameras, as long as we do not have reasonable expectation of privacy in public under
the judgment of the Supreme Court?10 Professor Daniel J. Solove, in his book Nothing to Hide,
describes the Supreme Court’s conception of privacy as “a form of total secrecy. 11 Under that
secrecy paradigm, people cannot expect privacy if they expose their information in any way. But
Solove contends that this interpretation does not fairly match today’s social expectation of privacy
in information in any way.12 The Court’s approach thus limits people’s freedom, especially when
people are engaging in political protest or dissent. “The problem with the secrecy paradigm,”
Solove argues, “is that we do expect some degree of privacy in public.”13 When people are in
public, they expect that they won’t be followed around or secretly recorded. Justice Alito, in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones,14 raised similar concerns that the use of longer term
monitoring impinges on people’s expectations of privacy.
Moreover, the development of new technologies would make the monitoring more systematic
and more intrusive. Video surveillance is a crucial part of the government’s surveillance system
and is being used alongside other powerful technologies, such as biometric technologies, 15
telecommunications, digital computer technologies, and tagging and tracking technologies. In
combination with emerging technologies, such as automatic license plate recognition (ALPR),

N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 771 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
11
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 100 (2011).
12
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1260 (1998).
13
SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 178.
14
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
15
Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 408 (2012).
9

10
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facial recognition software, and third-party databases, the video surveillance system could become
extremely powerful as a highly efficient investigation tool, which could be used either for legal
purposes or illegitimate ones merely based on the user’s will. Keith Proctor predicts that “[t]he
future of surveillance is ‘video analytics,’ where computers will automatically analyze camera
feeds to count people, register temperature changes, and, via statistical algorithms, identify
suspicious behavior.” 16 In this way, “prediction and scoring of individuals' risk of criminal
behavior” will magnify the harm to privacy.17
The pervasive and technologically sophisticated nature of modern surveillance is the outcome
of bureaucracy and the desire for efficiency, speed, control and coordination. In other words, the
surveillance originated from the government for the good of society. Yet its power and the
possibility of abuse are worrisome. As scholars who have examined surveillance in Britain have
observed, “the surveillance society” requires special vigilance from those who care about human
and civil rights.18
To date, however, no branch of government has taken any meaningful action. At the national,
state, and local level, governments have done little to seriously regulate surveillance. This paper
aims at finding out why that is the case and explores possible ways to go in the future. Part I
describes the general status of pervasive video surveillance in the United States and abroad, as
well as the threats it poses to the privacy. Part II focuses on the deadlock responding to regulation

Proctor, supra note 5.
Kevin Miller, Total Surveillance, Big Data, and Predictive Crime Technology: Privacy's Perfect Storm, 19 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 105, 106 (2014).
18
First, large-scale technological infrastructures are peculiarly prone to large-scale problems. Second, it is equally
important to remember the point about the corruptions and skewed visions of power. Third, all true surveillance
systems are meant to discriminate between one group and another, and it is difficult for the problem to be brought
into open when high-technology is involved. Fourth, the surveillance might undermine the social relationship which
depends on trust. Finally, the surveillance distracts people from alternatives and from larger and more urgent
questions. It is still a question whether this is really the best way of pursuing these goals. SURVEILLANCE STUDIES
NETWORK, supra note 1, at 2-4.
16
17
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of video surveillance, including responses of three branches of government in the United States
and among the public. Part III analyzes the factors lying in the three branches that would impede
taking actions, compares the practice in the United States with experience in other countries, and
tries to find a weakest point to break the deadlock. In Part IV, this paper concludes that public
participation is the key to breaking through the deadlock in light of the democratic political
structure in the United States. Part V is the conclusion.

I. A Brief Overview of Public Video Surveillance and Privacy

A. Pervasive Video Surveillance in the U.S. and Abroad
The history and mechanism of the video surveillance system
Public video surveillance using CCTV has a history of more than 50 years. In September
1968, Olean, New York became the first city in the United States to install video cameras along its
main business street to fight crime.19 Contrary to its reputation, Britain is not the first country to
adopt CCTV in public places. It started its first permanent and systematic use of public CCTV in
1975, when London Transport introduced CCTV into the Subway system. Before that, CCTV was
mainly deployed in the private sector businesses such as retail stores and supermarkets.20 During
the 1980s, video surveillance began to diffuse, specifically focusing on crime prevention in public
areas. In the 1990s, digitalization and the introduction of video analytics transferred CCTV from

19

Robb, Gary C., Police Use of CCTV Surveillance: Constitutional Implications and Proposed Regulations,
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM, 572, (1979).
20
McCahill M, Norris C. CCTV in Britain. Center for Criminology and Criminal Justice-University of Hull, 2002:
1-70, 8. (U.K.).
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sole video transmission (and data recording) to distributed camera systems that are capable of
performing low-level analysis in real time. Now, video surveillance has gone to the “second
generation surveillance,” which shows “the change from a dumb camera that needs a human eye
to evaluate its images to a computer-linked camera system that evaluates its own video images.21
The explosive growth of CCTV implementation globally has been possible because of
dropping camera prices and increasing network connectivity. Although it is difficult to judge the
exact number of surveillance cameras in each country due to lack of any register of publicly owned
cameras and issues of private ownership,22 there is clear evidence of massive deployments taking
place in North America, China, and Europe.23
Over this long period, the content of the concept “video surveillance” has kept evolving with
the development of technology, as well as the promise and expectations of video surveillance. As
Professor Bernhard Rinner explains:
The main objective in the early days was simply to extend the visual sensing capabilities
of the observer to the site of interest, while recent surveillance systems are expected to
perform complex analysis tasks with the goal to understand what is going on in the
monitored area.24
Today, most public CCTV video surveillance systems are cameras utilizing digital video recorders
(DVRs) transmitting signals to a centralized setting, actively and remotely monitored by security
personnel in a control room, or passively taped for future viewing if needed. This is different from
the earliest systems involved constant monitoring because there was no way to record and store
information.

Surette R., The thinking eye: Pros and cons of second generation CCTV surveillance systems. 28(1), POLICING:
INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT., 152 (2005)
22
Kroener I., “Caught on Camera”: The media representation of video surveillance in relation to the 2005 London
Underground bombings. 11(1/2) SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y, 121 (2013). (U.K.).
23
Porikli F, Brémond F, Dockstader S L, et al. Video surveillance: past, present, and now the future. 30(3) IEEE
SIGNAL PROCESSING MAGAZINE, 190, 190 (2013).
24
Id.at 191.
21
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Over the last few decades, CCTV technologies have evolved into a combination of
sophisticated video equipment technologies and software technologies. Regarding the equipment,
innovations including “night vision cameras, computer assisted operations, and motion detectors
that allow an operator to instruct a system to go on ‘red alert’ when anything moves in view of the
cameras” have considerably enhanced surveillance systems.25 There have been technologies to
protect camera lenses such as bulletproof casing and automated self defense mechanisms.
Furthermore, picture clarity has improved (many cameras are able to read a cigarette package label
at a hundred meters), while digital compact disk quality and the capabilities like zooming in,
panning, and tilting have helped make the system more powerful. At the same time, cameras have
also been becoming smaller and cheaper.26
Software technologies also play a crucial role in what is called “automated video
surveillance.”27 As early as the 1960s, there have been patents in the United States describing a
television system for detection of differences,28 and a television surveillance system that outputs
an alarm by using the differences between the sample data and data average.29 However, even
today, the promise of video content analysis with computers has not been fulfilled. The content of
video surveillance still depends on manual analysis. Thus, a tension appears between an enormous
and ever-increasing store of data—far more than any human can ever view or analyze—with the
limited number of human operators and the lack of constant attention. 30 One solution being
explored is crowd sourcing for content analysis. 31 Others include advanced analytics and

Nieto M, Johnston-Dodds K, Simmons C W., PUBLIC AND PRIVATE APPLICATIONS OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND
3-4 (California State Library, California Research Bureau) (2002).
26
Id, at 4.
27
Porikli, supra note 23, at 191.
28
U.S. Patent 3114797, 1963.
29
U.S. Patent 3590151, 1966.
30
Porikli, supra note 23, at 192.
31
Crowd sourcing refers to the use of the footage by placing it on social media, resulting in a groundbreaking
25

BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES
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processing in which algorithms help to distill the data into useful intelligence.32
New technologies and the future of total surveillance
Contrary to the argument that video cameras are “no different from a pair of eyes,”33 the true
power of video surveillance lies in the fact that the system can transcend the ordinary power of
human observation with the ability to zoom in, track, record and analyze. Cameras are connected
together and people’s acts everywhere can be recorded into an integrated system. In this system,
the most powerful tool for law enforcement is known as facial recognition technology, which
automatically matches the faces of surveilled individuals to known target faces in a comparison
database, and provides an alert when a target hit appears. With this technology, the operator can
identify a person of interest in a crowd within a few seconds, and acquire all acts that person has
done recently to draw a whole map of his or her public activities. Public use of face recognition
systems was first launched in the London borough of Newham in 1998. In the United States, the
failure of traditional security measures to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks has spurred the adoption
of facial recognition systems in airports and other public places.34
Although NYPD guidelines indicate that the police will refrain from using facial recognition
technology, they do not guarantee this technology will not be used forever. Patent activity alone
demonstrates that the technology has come of age. Between 1970 and 1995, the U.S. Patent Office
granted fewer than 10 patents involving facial recognition. Between 2001 and 2011, the number
leapt to 633. These patents are increasingly focused on, and applicable to, law enforcement and

collaboration between the police and the public.
32
Porikli, supra note 23, at 192.
33
Siegel L, Perry R A, Gram M H, Who’s Watching? Video Camera Surveillance in New York City and the Need for
Public Oversight. A Special Report by the New York Civil Liberties Union, (2006),
http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/surveillance_cams_report_121306.pdf.
34
Surette, supra note 21.
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national security. 35 At the same time, despite some doubts about its accuracy rates in some
circumstances,36 facial recognition has been discussed heatedly in the technologies field.37 There
is considerable research underway aimed at overcoming the shortcomings.38 And facial recognition
is also the first step in one of the most active topics in computer science: human motion analysis,
which concerns mainly detection, tracking and recognition of human behavior. 39
Video cameras are considered the prototypical method of surveillance, but there are also a
variety of other emerging technologies that, when combined, could create an inescapable net of
total surveillance. Such technologies include automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems
and biometric technologies. ALPR systems can scan and track the movements of vehicles.
According to one survey with responses from over 70 agencies in 2012, 85% of responding police
departments had implemented or expected to implement ALPR within the next five years. 40
Biometric-based identity management systems are considered to augment or supersede existing
identity verification tools. A biometric database, for instance, could potentially require the
collection of the digital photos, fingerprints, iris scans, and/or DNA of all citizens and noncitizens.41
When location and biometric data is unified in centralized repositories along with other data

Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 407, 410 (2012).
36
Klontz J C, Jain A K, A case study on unconstrained facial recognition using the boston marathon bombings
suspects, 13 Michigan State University Technical Report MSUCSE, 4 (2013).
37
Generally see, Wechsler, Harry, et al., eds. Face recognition: From theory to applications, 163 SPRINGER
SCIENCE & BUSINESS MEDIA, (2012).
38
eg. Pagano C, Granger E, Sabourin R, et al. Adaptive ensembles for face recognition in changing video
surveillance environments, 286 INFORMATION SCIENCES, 75 (2014);
Best-Rowden L, Han H, Otto C, et al. Unconstrained face recognition: Identifying a person of interest from a media
collection, Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 2014, 9(12): 2144-2157.(U.K.).
39
Bhaltilak K V, Kaur H, Khosla C., Human Motion Analysis with the Help of Video Surveillance: A Review, 4(9)
INT’L J. COMPUTER SCI. ENGINEERING TECH (IJCSET), 245 (2014).
40
Police Executive Research Forum, How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming Policing?, PERF Critical
Issues in Policing Series report (2012), available at http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-inpolicingseries/Technology_web2.pdf.
41
Margaret Hu, Biometric Id Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1477 (2013).
35

11

collected by the government and private entities, ranging from mobile camera phones used by the
public and hand-held cameras used by police patrols on city streets to conventional
telecommunication data, it creates large data sets from which meaningful information could be
distilled. “Big data analysis” uses computation to examine large data sets for correlations, to turn
a morass of data into useful information. The future of total surveillance is predictive systems built
on big data, which can identify patterns by correlations from the past events or individual behaviors
or generalized high crime areas, with the goal of complete pre-crime prediction. In the book and
film Minority Report, which no discussion of the predictive systems could bypass, a dystopia might
become the reality where the police feel comfortable in arresting people for what they are foreseen
to do.42 The only difference is the prediction in Minority Report relies on clairvoyants, while the
prediction in the future real world might be computers with surveillance feeders. 43
The purpose of the public video surveillance and the effectiveness evaluation
Despite those risks, in the worldwide context, the public video surveillance systems are very
popular and have received widespread support from politicians, policy-makers and citizens.
Surveillance is advertised as a way to combat terrorism, to deter and detect crime, to prevent
disorder and antisocial behavior, and more generally to make people feel safer. Public video
surveillance is said to be a cost-effective investigational tool, which can help speed up
investigations and encourage offenders to plead guilty. The police can use it to identify offenders,
witnesses, to prove or disprove alibis and versions of events, or to provide evidence for trials.
Moreover, cameras in public places could also be used as an administrative and socialmanagement tool for deploying officers more effectively, to monitor incidents and suspicious

42
43

Spielberg, Steven, and Philip K. Dick. Minority Report. California: Dreamworks, 2002.
Miller, supra note 17, at 113.
12

behavior, to allow early interventions to reduce the severity of incidents, and to provide guidance
for officers on the scene. In addition, prominent cameras in highly visible locations are presumed
to have a deterrent effect on potential offenders.44
One remarkable example is the use of the video surveillance following the Boston Marathon
bombing event on April 15, 2013. “The massive number of cell phones and closed circuit cameras
on the street provide an incredible wealth of video and photo.”45 It was only 88 hours before the
suspects were positively identified.46
Although combatting crime and terrorism are the most important goals of surveillance
systems, many people take the impacts of public video surveillance for granted. In fact, evidence
on the effectiveness of the public video surveillance is still inconclusive and fairly contradictory.
A systematic review that summarized 46 relevant studies from both the USA and Britain on the
effectiveness of CCTV in crime reduction in 2002, according to strict methodological criteria,
concluded that CCTV reduces crime only to a small degree; that it is most effective in reducing
vehicle crime in car parks or parking lots; and that it has little or no effect on crime in public
transport and city center settings.47 These conclusions are consistent with earlier research, which
argued that anti-crime policy aiming at serious crimes such as terrorism had become, in practice,
more often applied to less serious behavior and antisocial activities (like littering, public urinating,
traffic control, drunkenness, parking violations, and public smoking).48 Meanwhile, other research
indicates that, instead of deterring or preventing crime, surveillance merely displaces crime in

LEVESLEY T, MARTIN A, BRITAIN G. POLICE ATTITUDES TO AND USE OF CCTV, (Home Office, 2005). (U.K.).
M. Stroud. In Boston bombing, flood of digital evidence is a blessing and a curse. THE VERGE, April 16, 2013,
http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/16/4230820/in-boston-bombing-flood-of-digital-evidence-is-a-blessing-and-acurse.
46
Klontz, supra note 36, at 4.
47
WELSH B C, FARRINGTON D P, CRIME PREVENTION EFFECTS OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION: A SYSTEMATIC
REVIEW, Home Office, 2002 (U.K.).
48
Campbell, D. and Ross, L., The Connecticut crackdown on speeding, 3 LAW & SOC’Y REV., 33 (1968).
44
45
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various forms.49
Because Britain is at the forefront of using cameras to monitor public space, most of
understanding on the effects of cameras is based on Britain’s experience and research. Perhaps
surprisingly, CCTV in Britain was introduced and largely implemented before 1994, prior to any
systematic evaluation of its effectiveness in reducing crimes.50 Since then, there have been positive
findings as well as negative findings. A study in 1999 found a reduction of 25% crime rates
sustained a period over two years.51 That was undoubtedly a successful example, but a rare one.
According to an analysis by Dr. Michael McCahill and Professor Clive Norris, no other studies
had shown the same consistent and positive results. Instead, some studies had found CCTV has no
overall impact, and that both functional and geographical displacements existed.52
Although even fewer studies in the United States have examined the effectiveness of public
video surveillance, existing research shows a consensus that the implementation of public video
surveillance might have impact on the crime rates, but a number of involving factors are
complicated and intertwined, such as the type of crime in question, the location of the cameras,
the concentration of cameras, monitoring practices, and the study design.
For example, a study in 2009 shows the effects of public surveillance cameras in Philadelphia.
Despite variation across individual camera sites, serious crime decreased by about 5% in the postintervention period, and disorder crimes decreased by 16%. When serious and disorder crime were
analyzed together, the camera implementation was associated with a 13% decline in the postintervention period.53 Another empirical study in Schenectady, examining an area of 10 square
Clarke, M., Blind eye on the street?, POLICE REV., August, 29 (1994).
McCahill, supra note 20.
51
Armitage R, Smyth G, Pease K, Burnley CCTV evaluation, Surveillance of public space: CCTV, street lighting
and crime prevention, 1999, 10: 225-50. (U.K.).
52
McCahill, supra note 20, at 8.
53
Ratcliffe, J., Taniguchi, T., & Taylor, R. B, The crime reduction effects of public CCTV cameras:
49
50
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miles with a population of more than 60,000, revealed that “the surveillance cameras have had
effects on overall crime levels. But these effects have not been achieved consistently.”54 Cameras
are more often associated with declines in personal crime, rather than property crime.55 And the
findings may reflect that there is an interactive relationship between camera surveillance and the
nature of the location as well as the nature of offenses in those locations. But cameras appear to be
successful at reducing disorder, which is similar to the effectiveness of cameras elsewhere in the
United States.56
After the 9/11 attacks, actual or potential terrorist incidences justified calls for increased using
of public video surveillance. Yet one study has concluded that the installation of cameras has a
relatively smaller deterrent effect on terrorism than on other forms of crime.”57 In fact, as one
summary of the existing research notes, CCTV is not chosen as a counter-terrorism tool because
it is effective. “Indeed, we do not know whether they are (effective).”58 In this article, the authors
also indicate that U.S. police agencies do not regularly employ surveillance interventions for the
specific purpose of countering terrorism. They view Department of Homeland Security grants as

A multi-method spatial approach. 26 JUSTICE QUARTERLY, 746 (2009).
54
McLean S J, Worden R E, Kim M S., Here’s Looking at You An Evaluation of Public CCTV Cameras and Their
Effects on Crime and Disorder, 38(3) CRIM. JUSTICE REV., 303, (2013).
55
Numerous previous studies by independent scholars have concluded that video surveillance cameras in fact do not
reduce violent crime, and only in certain circumstances reduce property crime. A 2008 study of Los Angeles’
cameras, by the University of Southern California (“USC”), found no statistically significant impact on violent
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recent efforts to increase the use of technologies by police agencies for counterterrorism purposes.
Thus they suggest that “if governments wish to increase the use of technologies in law
enforcement efforts against terrorism, not only must they be willing to fund such efforts, but
technologies must also be shown, through evaluation, to be effective, cost effective, and easy to
use and operate.”59
Although most research focuses on crime rates, there are also studies emphasizing the
sociological processes of video surveillance as a policy tool increasingly deployed in the security
field. Professor Clive Norris in his study illustrated that the symbolic value of CCTV was most
important because its visibility could send a message to the public that the government was doing
something about the crime problem.60

B. Threats to Privacy
Public video surveillance has more than one facet that may invade people’s rights protected
by the Constitution. One main facet is the information privacy, which is frequently discussed in
the video surveillance field. However, pervasive public video surveillance involves a variety of
human behaviors, the body, use of space and other facts of privacy. The values relevant to those
behaviors transcend the mere value of protecting the personal information.
Consider the following examples of threats people may face without adequate oversight of
public video surveillance:
1. Recorded surveillance footage may be private or embarrassing, even if it records public
movements and activities (e.g. medical appointments, romantic liaisons, social activities). The
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Supreme Court has long held that it is unconstitutional for the government to require that
individuals identify themselves while speaking in public or to require the disclosure of
membership lists.61 But a video camera deployed on the entrance of a building could easily
reveal the members of the organization as clear as a membership list.62 Furthermore, cameras
have the ability to cross the line between the public and the private. Here is how Sarah Duguid,
a Financial Times reporter, described her experience with a London police camera operator:
“He zooms in on three young men wearing baseball caps. He gets so close to them that I can
read the brand of their mobile phone. ‘Theoretically,’ explained the operator, ‘I could read a
text message from here.’” 63 The same thing occurs in the United States. Most Chicago
surveillance cameras can be used to zoom in to see small objects at great distances, thus they
can also be used to aim at particular members of the public.64
2. Cameras may be misused or recordings leaked by officers. As another journalist explained in
2001 after observing a camera control room in Great Britain: “When you put a group of bored,
unsupervised men in front of live video screens and allow them to zoom in on whatever
happens to catch their eyes, they tend to spend a fair amount of time leering at women.”65 Both
in Britain and the United States, there were reports of officers improperly manipulating
surveillance cameras to focus in on women’s breasts and buttocks.66 There have also been high-
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profile examples of recordings and other information being leaked. In one notorious case, the
State of Florida had been selling photographic images and other personal information stored
on driver’s license to commercial marketers. 67 In the Bronx, a young man’s suicide in the
elevator was caught on one of the 200 closed-circuit cameras set up in city housing projects as
part of the NYPD’s Video Interactive Patrol Enhances Response program. A police officer
emailed this recording to his friend, and the recording was later posted on a porn website.68 In
Indiana, a school technician was arrested after he forwarded to his home computer images of
students taken by a school video surveillance camera.69 In Washington, a video surveillance
camera in a high school captured two girls kissing and holding hands, and the dean of students
shared video of the incident with one of the girl’s parents.70 Some breaches can and do occur
even with clear rules and procedures in place.71 In addition, improper access poses serious
risks. In practice, people not properly authorized to view or work with data about individuals
could be involved rather than only trained security personnel who are supposed to exclusively
do the monitoring job. 72 The potential for misuse of information could increase if data is
available to people lack of privacy protection awareness. And those people are hardly held
accountable if they are unidentified.
3. Cameras installed for security purposes might also be used for other purposes, even illegal ones.
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Some may be used to sanction non-criminal behavior such as dress code infractions, smoking
or drinking in prohibited areas, and dogs walking in the building.73 According to NYCLU’s
report, the expansion beyond a project’s original goals could be worse. The database could be
used for illegitimate purposes, such as discrimination and bias.
In the absence of legal constraints, the illicit purposes for which video images may be
used are limited only by the imagination. Police officials could create a video archive of
anti-war protestors. An NYPD video unit might target black or Latino youth who enter a
majority-white neighborhood. A security professional could use video records to stalk
someone.74
It is shocking that only racial minorities are presented as the targets of surveillance in Chicago’s
training DVD for officers using the surveillance cameras.75 And in a study of 592 hours of
camera monitoring in England, the finding reveals black people were between 1.5 and 2.5
times more likely to be watched than one would expect from their presence in the population
being monitored. Furthermore, 68% of all surveillance for “no obvious reason” is of blacks,
compared to 35% of whites.76
4. Recordings could be used by the police to harass or threaten politicians or critics. After the
9/11 attacks, the police have found it easier to engage in investigating the political activities
since regulations on them are loosened in the name of counter-terrorism. For instance, the
Handshu Agreement, which regulates police behavior in New York City regarding political
activity, was modified in 2003 in light of the heightened threat of terrorism. The standard of
commencing an investigation was changed from “specific information”77 indicating the crime,
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to “information indicating the possibility of the crime.”78 In 2004, the Republican National
Convention in New York was blanket videotaped by the NYPD,79 and if the police departments
retain these digital images, there is a risk that “they will serve as a permanent, ‘searchable’
archive—in essence, visual dossiers on dissenters.”80 Another example is the risk that Chicago
civilians engaged in activities protected by the First Amendment could be aimed and zoomed
at by the surveillance operators under Chicago police policy, based on a mere “proper law
enforcement purpose.” Scholars argue that this standard is too nebulous to guide officers’
discretion, or to provide a meaningful framework for later review.81
5. Chilling effect: the very existence of surveillance might discourage lawful public activities by
undermining personal autonomy. If people will be forced to constantly ask themselves when
even the smallest action is taken, “Will this act look suspicious? Will my normal behavior now
collected by the government and come back to haunt me someday if I become a target?” they
will feel unfree and insecure. When people realize every event or statement that he might regret
is recorded by the ongoing surveillance and might be viewed by others one day, their behavior
will definitely be less spontaneous. In other words, someone being closely and steadily
watched is very likely to feel loss of freedom and gross discomfort due to being under a
magnifying glass of the government.
6. Facial recognition could be combined with other data sources to create a comprehensive log of
a person’s life, routines, habits and travels. When viewed in the aggregate, people’s private
thoughts or goals could be revealed by the public authorities by collecting pieces of person’s
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life and put them together to get a comprehensive picture of his interests. And because facial
recognition or other databases could link those observations to an identity, people lose not only
their privacy, but also their anonymity. The new technologies raise serious concerns because
there is a qualitative difference between visual confirmation of a person’s location (a naked
eye theory82) and the vast history of data stored by or accessible to the government (a mosaic
theory83).

Ⅱ.Deadlock in Responding to Video Surveillance

The threats to privacy discussed in the prior part have had some impact on the U.S.
government. Until the late 1960s, local law-enforcement agencies in the U.S. had not adopted
surveillance cameras because of concerns about “underdeveloped technology, excessive cost and
unfavorable public opinion.” 84 But nowadays, two of these concerns have clearly diminished,
although public opinion remains mixed. Since multiple factors have spurred the vast
implementation of public surveillance, most of research in this area argues for regulations rather
than suggesting that video surveillance be abandoned, which is impossible. The balance is
important: “for CCTV technology to be used most effectively, it must be used efficiently while
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maintaining people's faith in government—faith that they are safe, that their taxes are being spent
on programs that enhance public safety, and that their civil liberties are not being compromised in
the process.”85
Despite those wishes for balance, in fact, public video surveillance has not yet been under
adequate regulations. Facing this new technology being implemented on a vast scale, all three
branches of the U.S. government—the judicial, the executive, and the legislative—have responded
poorly. None of them has taken meaningful actions to seriously regulate surveillance systems or
to address the privacy issues raised by them.

A. Judicial Review of Video Surveillance
Regarding privacy, a number of actions in the U.S. courts may place limits on excessive
surveillance. Apart from describing the fact that the emerging video surveillance technologies fall
outside the definition of the search under the Fourth Amendment, this part will explore actions
taken under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and explain why they are always struck down
by the court.
Fourth Amendment
It is often argued that pervasive public video surveillance might violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” As one Fourth
Amendment scholar has pointed out:
[A] detective or spy wishing to build a dossier on an individual’s life and personality
would probably learn more from examining a searchable database of such images than he
would by rummaging through a purse, wallet, or suitcase, especially if he could link from
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the images to other information about the individual’s identity and background.86
This concern, however, has not received a clear answer from the Supreme Court. The
concurring opinion in the latest case United States v. Jones87 indicates a direction where Fourth
Amendment protections might go, which is to draw a constitutional distinction between shortterm surveillance and prolonged, pervasive monitoring. But the current dominant precedents
rule that public video surveillance does not trigger the Fourth Amendment issue.
In the landmark case Katz v. United States,88 the Court established a two-pronged test for
determining whether government’s investigative activity rises to the level of a search. First, the
government’s conduct must offend the citizen’s subjective manifestation of a privacy interest.
Second, that the expectation should be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”.89
Under Katz, people do not have reasonable expectation in public places. In United States v.
Knotts, 90 the Court upheld the warrantless use of a beeper used by law enforcement to track
movements of a criminal suspect. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stressed the suspect's
diminished expectation to privacy in an automobile on a public thoroughfare.
When [the defendant] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone
who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular
direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he
exited from public roads onto private property.91
In addition, under Katz, visual inspection is not always a “search.” In California v. Ciraolo,92
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the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the naked-eye aerial observation of
respondent's backyard. But if the surveillance engages in more than naked-eye observation, the
outcome under the Fourth Amendment may be different. In Kyllo v. United States93 the Court held
that:
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a
constitutional protected area,” constitutes a search—at least where the technology in
question is not in general public use.
The Katz test has been criticized as an outmoded method in the technologically advanced
society, where very little information can be kept private. Professor Stephen E. Henderson argues
that the reasonable expectation of privacy test should be dropped, because “technology will lead
to no privacy, and police practice will incorporate that technology to create a reality of no
privacy.”94
The Supreme Court, perhaps realizing the limits of the Katz test, returned to a kind of physical
trespass analysis in Jones. In that case, law enforcement officers installed a GPS tracking device
on an individual’s vehicle and subsequently used that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements
on public streets. The Court applied trespass principle here instead of the reasonable expectation
of privacy test, reasoning that the officers had physically intruded into the defendant’s
constitutionally protected privacy rights. A concurring opinion by Justice Alito declined to take
that approach, instead applying the Katz test and suggesting that the “relatively short-term
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets” was ok, but “the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses” might violate the Fourth Amendment in the absence
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of a search warrant.95
Justice Alito realizes the challenges caused by emerging new surveillance technologies may
invade privacy much more severely than before. “In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections
of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.” 96 The resources required
impeded the outrageous use of the monitoring methods. But the “devices like the one used in the
present case . . . make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”97
It is understandable that the Court in Jones hesitated to rush to resolve this novel question.
As Justice Alito explained, “the best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine.”98 Tellingly, however, he also suggested that the judiciary might have only
a limited role to play in regulating video surveillance: “In circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”99
FOIA
Despite falling outside the protection of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, people who
value their privacy may have another federal option: requesting that the government disclose
information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Public access to the contents of
individual information captured by the surveillance systems would be controversial, and might
itself violate privacy rights, 100 or might allow criminals to take advantage of the information.
Nonetheless, FOIA disclosure can bring the kind of transparency that democracy needs to oversee
government acts.
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Knowing how the police department implements the video surveillance system is vital to the
public interest because classified methods may be illegal. In addition, potential abuse of this
system will invade everyone’s privacy. However, as a result of a tangled understanding of FOIA,
at present the public’s desire to know the watcher behind the cameras is not satisfied.
A notable example comes from the NYCLU. In 2007, the organization filed requests with the
NYPD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under FOIL and FOIA, trying to discover
how the City's video surveillance system was being implemented and operated. The NYCLU’s
goal was to draw a picture for the public.101 The response from the NYPD to the request was to
provide merely one document. The NYPD asserted that the rest of documents sought “were either
exempt from disclosure or could not be located.”102Although additional documents were disclosed
after an administrative appeal, most were just budgetary worksheets and funding requests.103
In the federal court, the defendant was the DHS, from which the NYPD received grant
funding. Documents at issue were mainly about the location of cameras, the types of equipment
used and the implementing timeline of the New York video surveillance system. The government
relied principally on FOIA Exemption 7(E), which applies to
[R]ecords or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose
techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would
disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.104
The police department was afraid that potential criminals could take advantage of the information,
thereby facilitating “circumvention of the law.”
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Because the court agreed that the generally known routine technologies and procedures were
not under Exemption 7(E), the key issue was whether the information the plaintiff requested was
“identical” to the publicly available information. The district court held that the request was not
identical to information publicly available, and therefore, allowed the police’s refusal to disclose
documents under the exemption.105 The court noted that the public did not know specific locations
of cameras and license plate readers used in the initiative, not to mention methods of data
transmitting. It agreed with the government that such information could be used to circumvent the
law.106 After argument, DHS withdrew its claim that the total number of cameras and license plate
readers used or planned for the surveillance system were also exempt from disclosure. Yet even
after that information was no longer at issue in the case, NYPD still refused to disclose that
information. 107
Under analysis, the “identical” requirement is an extremely high standard. If the government
had not initially released the information before the FOIA request, it would be very hard to prove
the public available information is identical to the inside government information. Although there
are possibilities that information could be released by an informant, it is unlikely that the public
can rely on a Deep Throat or other whistleblower. Thus, after the case, it is much harder for the
public in New York to know the whole picture of the video surveillance system, as long as the
court relies on “the identical to public availability” doctrine to justify the refusal to disclose
information. Meanwhile, the incentive of initial reveals by the government decreased. The reason
is simple: the government does not want the initially released information come back to haunt it.
A similar result occurred in Chicago, according to a study “Chicago's Video Surveillance
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Cameras: A Pervasive and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy”:
When the ACLU sent a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the City regarding
its camera system, the City refused to state whether there had been any alleged misuse of
the cameras, and did not disclose any electronic data regarding the cameras' alleged
effectiveness. Likewise, there was no public information available regarding the total
number of cameras, the location of most cameras, the total amount of money spent on the
cameras, and the sources of that money. Moreover, the City repeatedly failed to respond to
the ACLU's requests for permission to visit the OEMC's operations center, and repeatedly
failed to respond to the ACLU's letters proposing new regulations.108

B. Self-restraint by the Executive Branch
Despite silence from the judicial branch, the U.S. government does not operate in vacuum.
Some degree of self-restraint still exists in implementing and operating video surveillance systems.
But existing self-restraint regulation has more symbolic meaning than operational meaning. Its
inherent deficiency is that it is far from adequate to protect people’s privacy rights. An analysis of
NYPD guidelines echoes the previous concerns expressed by two scholars, Clive Norris and Gary
Armstrong, who found that many codes of practices in Britain contained “fine sounding rhetoric”
about the importance of individual privacy, but provided little in the way of actual protection
against intrusive or unwanted surveillance due to the lack of detail and definition regarding core
procedures.109
Intra-department Guidelines
In 2009, the NYPD published its “Public Security Privacy Guidelines” to establish policies
and procedures to limit the authorized use of the Domain Awareness System and to provide for
limited access to and proper disposition of stored data.110 According to the guidelines, the Domain
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Awareness System is technology deployed in public spaces as part of the counterterrorism program
of the NYPD’s Counterterrorism Bureau, including: NYPD-owned and Stakeholder-owned CCTV
providing feeds into the Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center; License Plate Readers;
and other domain awareness devices, as appropriate.111
By the statement of purpose, the Domain Awareness System is designed as a counterterrorism
tool:
Facilitate the observation of pre-operational activity by terrorist organizations or their
agents, detect and deter terrorists’ attacks, provide a degree of common domain awareness
for all Stakeholders, reduce incident response times, and create a common technological
infrastructure to support the integration of new security technology.112
In response to privacy concerns, the guidelines announce that:
[N]o person will be targeted or monitored by the Domain Awareness System solely
because of actual or perceived race, color, religion or creed, age, national origin, alienage,
citizenship status, gender (including gender identity), sexual orientation, disability,
marital status, partnership status, military status, or political affiliation or beliefs.113
The guidelines further state that the system will be used only to monitor public areas and public
activities, and that the powerfully intrusive facial recognition technology will not be utilized. The
guidelines set a Pre-Archival Period for Video of 30 days. After that, the data must be destroyed
unless retention approved by the Authorized Agent. And for data use, intra-approval procedures
are listed.114 In addition, the guidelines make clear that all personnel access to the system will
complete privacy training.115
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Lack of Constraint
Although addressing some concerns, basically, the guidelines are a rough outline. A few key
issues are ignored or avoided. Because even with clear rules and procedures in place, horrendous
privacy violations can and do occur, as previously discussed,116 it is hard to count on these outlines
to protect privacy.
(1) Law enforcement purpose
From the beginning, the Domain Awareness System was designed for counterterrorism
purposes, as the guidelines clearly state. But law enforcement is another use of this system, even
though not listed in the primary purpose. Whereas anti-terrorism efforts involve high interests of
the national security, law enforcement efforts are more ordinary and much easier to confront with
the citizens’ daily life, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Since people’s privacy is susceptible to the
video surveillance used for law enforcement purpose, there should be clear regulations designed
for this purpose.
But there is no such limitation in the guidelines. Under the column “data usage,” the
guidelines state that “in limited circumstances, data from the Domain Awareness System may also
be used in furtherance of legitimate law enforcement and public safety purposes beyond the scope
of those purposes set out in the Statement of Purpose (III.B).”117 It is unclear what “the limited
circumstances” are. In addition, the “individual seeking to make the secondary use of data must
have a reason to believe the data will further a law enforcement or public safety purpose.”118 But
“a reason to believe” is mere a relevance standard, which means any reason is ok, no matter how
attenuated it may be. This requirement is too vague to guide the officer’s discretion or to provide
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meaningful line on which the intra-department authorized agent to decide. In addition, there is no
provision for outside review of the justification for the officer’s decision.
(2) Incidental use
The incidental use of the system needs no additional approval. If the user who applies the
system in furtherance of counterterrorism purpose incidentally notices something useful for a
legitimate law enforcement or public safety, no approval is needed, meaning that when someone
is sitting behind the cameras, there are no limits on the purposes for which he can use this powerful
system. The inherent possibility of abuse is not merely imaginary. Practices in other cities,
discussed above, make clear that the power behind the cameras is susceptible to abuse. For
instance, operators in Chicago have power to use video surveillance cameras to aim at particular
members of the public, and to zoom in to see small objects at great distances. This power cannot
be observed by ordinary people, let alone be overseen by them.119
Moreover, if the incidental use needs some exploration into the database to get some
comparative results, does the operator needs approval to do that? According to the incidental use
policy that the officers have to response quickly to the situation they observed, it is safe to make
an assumption that no approval is needed under that circumstance. Thus, the access to the database
under such circumstance is unfettered.
(3)Internal norms
There are some internal norms, but those restrictions are effectively toothless. For instance,
the secondary use of the data from the system has to be approved by an authorized inside agent, if
it is intentionally used for a legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose. The authorized
agents, however, are the Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism and the Deputy Commissioner
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for Legal Matters—both inside the police department. Moreover, as the last provision of the
guidelines makes clear, “Nothing in these Guidelines is intended to create any private rights,
privileges, benefits or causes of action in law or equity.”120 Thus, no doubt are the guidelines just
the internal norms, rather than having concrete legal consequences.

C. Legislation at the National, State, and Local Level
In Jones, Justice Alito thought new intrusions on privacy might spur the enactment of
legislation to protect against these intrusions. He saw this as what ultimately happened with respect
to wiretapping. After Katz, Congress did not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth
Amendment case law governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a
comprehensive statute, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006 ed. and Supp. IV), and since that time,
the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and not by case law. 121
Justice Alito’s opinion reflects the general attitude from the judicial branch and indicates that
the breakthrough in the privacy issue raised by the video surveillance might lie in the legislative
branch. In practice, however, the opposite may be true. A recent survey shows that with few
exceptions “the use of facial recognition and video surveillance remains surprisingly
unregulated.”122 As an exceptional example, the State of Virginia House of Delegates passed a bill
that requires law enforcement to get judicial approval before installing facial scanning technology,
limiting the technologies use to situations where it is likely to provide information about a felony.
The Virginia bill also bars law enforcement from retaining a person's image in a database unless
the facial recognition software matched her to a potential crime.123
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Contrary to the Virginia “notable exception,” however, the sequence of events in Chicago is
more common. The ACLU advocated for a bill that would have required every government agency
that operates or has access to public surveillance cameras to annually disclose their total number
of cameras, along with any camera privacy policies. But the bill failed to pass. Indeed, in 2012, an
ordinance allowed the Mayor of Chicago to purchase and deploy new surveillance cameras without
any approval from, or even notice to, the City Council.124 That experience is typical. A 2006 study
found that only 8 percent of jurisdictions operating video surveillance systems had
enacted legislation to regulate the systems' operation and use.125

D. Obstacles to Meaningful Regulation of Video Surveillance
Lack of public debate
In the progress of legislation, the power of public opinion plays an important role in a
democratic system. If the public has no opportunity to fully discuss issues involving peoples’ lives,
and to register their concerns and advocate some restraints on the use of power by the government,
quickly developed technology can endanger people’s rights.
The reality shows that valuable public participation in public video surveillance
implementation is absent in the United States. In 2005, Thomas J. Nestel, the Philadelphia Police
Staff Inspector, surveyed police departments in fifty largest U.S. cities, requesting from each its
policy and practice guidelines for video surveillance cameras. His study expressed concern that
the community was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation process.126
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Absence of public participation in the legislation partly lies in the fact that the public has
limited information about the video surveillance system and the potential threat this powerful
system can cause. It also lies partly in the secret nature of the video surveillance system itself,
which means the people cannot easily become aware of the abuse of the surveillance power or
bring individual lawsuits for the infringement of privacy rights.
First, lack of information is the direct result from police departments’ refusal to disclose
information. One scholar has identified two barriers to discussion, debate, and enforcement of
video surveillance regulations in New York. One is the NYPD's court-supported refusal to release
the majority of documents related to the operations of video surveillance programs. The other is
the unenforceable nature of the NYPD's Public Security Privacy Guidelines.127
Second, the individual is hard to detect this privacy invasion by cameras. If no requirement
on the government to disclose information initially, the abuses will go unnoticed since the
individual will not be sufficiently informed and empowered to challenge them.128
The interest of the industry
When careful policymakers want to make a decision, they should know whether this policy
is cost-effective. Considerable research has raised concerns about the cost-effectiveness of video
surveillance.129 In Britain, a number of local authorities have yearly operating budgets of over
$500,000 for camera systems that cover downtown areas.130 The annual budget of each of the
several 100-camera systems in New York City housing projects is approximately $850,000 just for

Greer, supra note 62, at 615.
Id. at 626.
129
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72
MISS. L.J. 213, 231-32 (2002).
130
G. Wade, Funding CCTV: The Story So Far, 7 CCTV TODAY 28 (1998).
127
128

34

staffing (i.e., not including the upfront costs of the cameras, the maintenance, new tapes, tape
storage, and associated expenditures). 131 Those figures raise the question whether other
alternatives, such as more patrols, better lighting and greater community participation in law
enforcement, could achieve equal or better results at less cost. The studies that have examined the
impact of video systems have found the systems to have less effect on crime than alternative
policing methods--like more beat officers or street lighting--that would cost the same amount of
money.132
That kind of cost-benefit analysis, especially the consideration of alternatives to replace video
surveillance, would probably make the mass surveillance industry in panic. The industry is a multibillion dollar business that has experienced phenomenal growth rates since 2001. According to
data provided by The Wall Street Journal, the retail market of surveillance tools has sprung up
from "nearly zero" in 2001 to about US$5 billion in 2011.133 The size of the video surveillance
market has risen from $11.5 billion in 2008 to $37.5 billion in 2015. 134 Some views that
disregarding the cost-benefit analysis can support that implementation are the promotor of this
giant industry. “In tragedy’s aftermath, it can be tough to have a serious conversation about how
much to invest. But when the goal is to push risk as close to zero as possible, spending can
asymptotically stretch into infinity.”135
Industry self-interest might be an important part of the story behind the tepid response to
video surveillance from the legislative process. The legislative process is not merely a forum for
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the protection of civil rights, but also a place where the businessmen try to influence in order to
acquire or keep their interests. When the voice advocating for public civil rights is relatively quiet,
no competing force in the legislation can counter a giant industry that benefits from the boom in
video surveillance implementation. After all, the natural attitude of the industry is to resist any
discussion or regulation on the implementation of video surveillance.
Public safety perspective
Putting aside insufficient public attention and the interests of industry, one crucial reason that
legislatures have been reluctant to limit video surveillance systems is concern about national
security and public safety.
After the September 11 attacks, the trend of using surveillance technologies has increased
rapidly. Although controversial, 136 the common view of these technologies is that they make
society safer by deterring and preventing terrorist attacks and crimes.
The extent to which such measures do anything to protect from further tragedies is
questionable, but largely irrelevant. For politicians, there is a need to be seen to be doing
something. And as the psychological, social or political conditions that give rise to such
incidents are complex, and possibly intractable, technological fixes which promise the
appearance, if not the reality of security are highly appealing. When such crises occur, funding
will be made available, more sober judgements as to effectiveness and alternatives ignored,
and legal restrictions and constitutional objections set aside, as it will be argued that the
balance between civil liberties and security will have to be tilted in favor of security.137

This expansion has lasted for 14 years. Now, the unification of diverse data sources, such as
video surveillance cameras linked with centralized facial image databases and facial recognition
software, digital identification based on fingerprints, retinal scans, and voice patterns, automobile
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tracking devices and tracking of cell phone data, is under way. These powerful systems could
become a centralized repository accessible to all governmental agencies and make watchers always
know who, and where, individuals are.138 As an indivisible part of this system, there is no doubt
that the video surveillance is a powerful law enforcement tool hard to discard.
To summarize, despite many years of requests for regulations, the reality has not actively
responded to the theory. Three branches’ responses to the video surveillance system discussed in
this part demonstrate that the privacy issue has become deadlocked due to the interacting effects
three branches place on each other:


The Supreme Court recognizes the privacy challenges raised by pervasive monitoring
systems, but has insisted that the proper solution might be legislative.



Under existing statutes, police and other executive agencies are exempt from
disclosing most of the information about the video surveillance system.



Due to the lack of disclosure, the public lacks complete information about the
implementation of the video surveillance system and public discussion becomes
inadequate.



Unawareness of the invasion of privacy makes it difficult for the public to take
individual judicial action.



Lack of public debate has a negative effect on the legislative process.



As a consequence, no legislative regulation of the police can emerge, leaving only
weak self-restraint norms to prevent abuses.
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Ⅲ. Strengths and Limits of the Judicial and Legislative Branches

Having identified a deadlock in the responses of each branch of government to the challenges
of public video surveillance, several questions are left open. Does the structure of the government
itself give rise to this deadlock? More importantly, where is the weak point in this deadlock the
privacy advocates could break through? The courts? Legislatures? The self-regulation practices of
police departments? Or the public?
As Dr. William Webster has proposed, a policy perspective might be more likely to offer a
comprehensive explanation for the CCTV revolution or the ongoing support for CCTV
technologies. The policy perspective
highlights the complex intertwined interactions between government, policymakers, the
media, service providers and users, and technological and policy developments. Such an
approach stresses the power relations and social interactions between different actors and
institutions in the governance and public policy process and points to CCTV as an
important social and policy construct and not just a technological artifact.139
Similarly, the following two parts will take the policy perspective to explore what three
branches of the government can and cannot do if they want to seriously regulate public video
surveillance, based on their positions and roles in the political structure. They do so by drawing
comparisons with Britain and China, and by considering how the Separation of Powers and
Federalism deeply rooted in the United States political system might be crucial factors that lead
the U.S. public video surveillance regulation practice to a different path.

A. Judicial Branch
The position to set a uniform standard
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In a federal system like the United States, obviously, the easiest way for the whole country to
adapt a new uniform standard of regulation is an opinion of the Supreme Court on a constitutional
issue. The Court is structurally positioned in the decentralized federal system to address national
concern about public video surveillance. But the opinions the Court has given, which focus mainly
on the reasonable expectation of privacy or trespass, have not proven as helpful in regulating video
surveillance as other kinds of surveillance.
In the past decades, the Supreme Court has succeeded in resolving some issues in the
surveillance area under the Fourth Amendment clause. With respect to wiretapping, the Supreme
Court in Katz ruled that the surveillance technique employed to a public booth constituted a Fourth
Amendment search because it violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Two particular features of public video surveillance, however, have complicated efforts to
bring such systems under the Fourth Amendment. First, video surveillance has surface-bound
nature which does not dig into the concealed things in human bodies, and it occurs in public places,
where people have no expectation of privacy under Katz. Thus, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
has differentiated video surveillance from other forms of monitoring by holding that it is not a
search at all. Second, even if public video surveillance is a search, it might be a “reasonable” search
if anti-terrorism is involved. As a result, pervasive public video surveillance remains unconstrained
by the Fourth Amendment.140
Of the various facets of the privacy threatened by public video surveillance, the most
frequently discussed is information privacy. But the logic of Katz leads to a dead end. People in
public places have no reasonable expectation of privacy is a crystal doctrine. Period.
The most coherent and elaborate repertoire of rules and techniques is concerned with the
protection of personal information, rather than personal movement, physical presence in
certain kinds of space, or bodily integrity as such, although these too are involved in the
140
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processing of information and personal data and to that extent remain governable by
legacy regulatory systems. 141
However, information privacy is just one crucial part of issue in the video surveillance area,
not the whole story. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not given a clear opinion on the other
facet of video surveillance—the pervasive suspicionless recording of people’s everyday public
lives. Katz and its progeny focus entirely on different sort of threats from surveillance, and do not
address anything as to the pervasive recording facet of public surveillance systems. Meanwhile,
the rule in Katz has limited the Court’s ability to address that facet in future cases. According to
Professor Marc Jonathan Blitz, the Supreme Court was stuck with the Katz test. Although Katz’s
goal was to extend Fourth Amendment privacy rights beyond those traditional privacy zones (most
notably the home), Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion led the Court into a narrower rule. The
reasonable expectation of privacy “appears to focus less on a person’s actions and more on the
place in which he acts,”142 which is on the opposite of the Court’s majority opinion, holding that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. This protection idea focusing on people could
have been “made portable and taken with people as they traveled from place to place.” 143 In
Professor Blitz’s view, “Justice Stewart’s majority opinion may bear as much as responsibility as
Harlan’s concurrence for the failure to extend constitutional privacy protections to public
spaces”144 because it did not provide guidance as to when activities in public should count as
private. “Its failure to provide any such limiting principle left future courts nothing to rely upon
except the familiar distinction between private and public areas.”145
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The growing power of public video surveillance is rooted in massive and integrated systems.
They are totally different from the decades-old practice of pointing a camera at someone. But the
Supreme Court has been nonchalant in responding to this dramatic change. It has acted “as though
these novel and far-reaching technological developments are not really novel at all— but rather
more effective and cost-efficient variants of long-accepted methods of police work.” 146 Most
surprisingly, in Jones, the Court even returned to the trespass test to supplement the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. From any perspective, it looks like the Court picked up the easiest way
to close the case, trying to avoid solving the real thorny problem.
Obviously, silence from the Court does not necessarily mean that the Court has not realized
the challenge posed by pervasive public video surveillance systems. Case law from around the
nation reveals some attitudes in the judicial branch. Some courts have tried to expand the category
of “private” environments in public places, holding for example that stores and workplaces qualify
as “private” environments.147 Although “no general privacy interest” exists in these places, being
videotaped in them is still forbidden because people may have expectation of privacy. Other courts
have doubted that public video surveillance can remain shielded from Fourth Amendment scrutiny,
basing on the reason as to the mass nature of the systems.148 The scale of the surveillance and the
degree to which it is constrained may determine the result whether it triggers the Fourth
Amendment or not. The clearest assertion was in Jones, where Justice Alito in his concurrence
stated: “[r]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term
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GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”149
Discussion
After decades of discussion, however, the Court in Jones ducked the chance to address the
constitutionality of public monitoring, resolving a challenge to GPS tracking on narrow trespass
ground rather than setting up new rules, even as it recognized the new threats from the emerging
video surveillance in public places. Several reasons may explain the Court’s reluctance.
First, modifying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as to privacy rights in public places would
require the reconsideration and perhaps overruling of considerable Supreme Court precedent,
which is entitled to respect under stare decisis. Since Katz has established a narrower rule and left
little room to protect the privacy of public places, the Court was stuck into it to some extent. On
the other hand, Professor Stuart M. Benjamin has pointed out that “Rapidly changing facts weaken
the force of stare decisis by undermining the stability of precedents.”150
Second, once the Court concludes that the pervasive recording of people’s public lives might
violate the Constitution, the first question it must answer is how to draw a line between pervasive
recordings and a permitted video surveillance. Any movement towards the direction that the
pervasive recording is unconstitutional may lead to a conclusion that all public video surveillance
systems should be forbidden. It is quite clear the Court does not want to step into that extreme and
awkward position.
Third, the Court might not be in better position than the legislature when new technologies
are involved. Justice Alito stated: “In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the
best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”151 When facing the new development of
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technologies, the Court is likely to try to catch up with it but could always be left behind. The facts
in the prior cases may not reflects the recent changes in the later ones. And compared with the
legislature, the judicial branch has less physical and administrative resources and is less
technologically sophisticated.152Moreover, because public video surveillance systems are used by
the executive branch as anti-terrorism and law enforcement tools, it is predictable that the Court
will be deferential to the decisions made by the executive branch.
In sum, although the Supreme Court is in a strong position to address the public video
surveillance issue in a national and uniform manner, there is little hope at present that society will
get clear guidance from the judicial branch on this matter. Because the new challenges brought by
these emerging technologies require a breakthrough in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and
it will be hard for the Court to draw a line between constitutional and unconstitutional of public
video surveillance without placing grave burdens on law enforcement. The Court is therefore likely
to await a response from the legislative process first.

B. Legislative Branch
This part will draw upon the experience of legislative limits on public video surveillance in
Britain and compare it with its counterparts in the United States.
Legislation in Britain
The use of CCTV systems in Britain remained unregulated for a long time, until the end of
1990s. Around that time, however, several acts of Parliament included elements regulating CCTV.
In 1998, the Human Rights Act was enacted to incorporate into UK law the rights contained in
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Act made a remedy for breach of a Convention
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right available in UK courts, without the need to go to the European Court of Human Rights. Thus,
the protection of privacy was set up in the statute.
The Data Protection Act of 1998 (DPA) is the main piece of legislation that governs
the protection of personal data in Britain. Although the Act itself does not mention privacy, it was
enacted to bring British law into line with the EU data protection directive of 1995 which required
Member States to protect people's fundamental rights and freedoms and their right to privacy with
respect to the processing of personal data in particular. It required that the installation and operation
of CCTV systems should comply with a specific legal basis, such as prevention and detection of
crime, apprehension and prosecuting the offenders or public/employee safety.153 It also set up a
registration requirement for surveillance systems.154 But critics charged that those acts were not
adequate for the privacy protection from the CCTV intrusion: “Both the new Data Protection and
Human Rights Acts have been toothless to prevent the expansion of CCTV and very weak at
regulating it once in place.”155
The more important acts were the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) and the
CCTV Codes of Practice, both enacted in 2000. The RIPA aims at making investigatory powers
used in accordance with human rights. One part is specifically designed to regulate the overt
surveillance activities of public authorities. Police and other agencies who use overt surveillance
have to follow the principles of proportionality, legality, accountability, necessity and
subsidiarity.156 RIPA also establishes an Investigatory Powers Tribunal to hear complaints about
surveillance by public bodies. Offenses involving the abuse of investigatory powers can be
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prosecuted.
The CCTV Codes of Practice were published by the information commissioner under the
DPA to provide detailed advice and guidance in applying the data protection principles in
operating the CCTV systems. This code was updated once in 2008 before the passing of the
Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) of 2012. The latest version of the CCTV Codes of Practice in
2015 “has changed to highlight its focus on the data protection implications of using CCTV and
other forms of surveillance cameras.”157
In 2012, the British government took a significant step to fulfill its commitment to the further
regulation of CCTV. The parliament passed the POFA to address public concerns caused by the
increasing use and technologically developments of the CCTV. Over the past decade, CCTV has
changed, from simply being a camera on top of a pole in the local town center where the images
were recorded, to much more sophisticated operations using digital and increasingly portable
technology. And more technologies such as Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) and
body worn cameras (BWC) are used commonly by the police. Since “surveillance cameras are no
longer a passive technology that only records and retains images, but is now a proactive one that
can be used to identify people of interest and keep detailed records of people’s activities,”158 more
public concerns are aroused “as to the technology no longer being used solely to keep people and
their property safe, but increasingly being used to collect evidence to inform other decisions.”159
The POFA plays an important role in regulating surveillance systems, the Section 30 of the
POFA 2012 has authorized the Secretary of State to issue a new surveillance camera code since
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June 2013 and appointed a Surveillance Camera Commissioner to promote the code and review
its operation and impact. The POFA code is also an important document to refer to for issues that
go beyond data protection. It addresses issues such as operational requirements, technical
standards and the effectiveness of the systems available. It regulates the police, police and crime
commissioners and local authorities in England and Wales, along with the National Crime Agency.
All other data controllers are encouraged to follow the POFA code.
As a latest and complete code specified to regulate the video surveillance in public places,
the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice (POFA code) sets out guiding principles designed to:
Provide a framework for operators and users of surveillance camera systems so that there
is proportionality and transparency in their use of surveillance, and systems are capable
of providing good quality images and other information which are fit for purpose.
Provide information and advice on appropriate and approved operational and technical
standards for various aspects of surveillance camera systems and on appropriate and
approved occupational and competency standards for persons using these systems or
processing images and information obtained by these systems to supplement this code.
Address concerns over the potential for abuse or misuse of surveillance by the state in
public places.160
The key components of the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice are 12 guiding principles:
1. Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is
in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need.
2. The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals
and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified.
3. There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as
possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints.
4. There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera system
activities including images and information collected, held and used.
5. Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera
system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them.
6. No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required
for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information
should be deleted once their purposes have been discharged.
7. Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be
clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted;
160
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the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for
such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes.
8. Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational,
technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet
and maintain those standards.
9. Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate
security measures to safeguard against unauthorized access and use.
10. There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements,
policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be
published.
11. When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and
there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to
support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and
information of evidential value.
12. Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares
against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to
date.161
Legislation in the United States
In the United States, by contrast, there is little federal law that specifically applies to video
surveillance in public places.
What Congress treats public video surveillance is entirely different from what it treats
electronic surveillance. After Katz, Congress followed up and promptly enacted a comprehensive
statute, The Wiretap Act. Shortly after, the Court in United States v. U.S. District Court,162 also
known as Keith, held that court approval was required in order for the domestic surveillance to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment. This established the precedent that a warrant needed to be obtained
before beginning electronic surveillance even if domestic security issues were involved. In 1978,
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), prescribes procedures for the
physical and electronic surveillance and collection of "foreign intelligence information" between
or among "foreign powers."
The Wiretap Act has been amended by Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
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(ECPA). The ECPA extended government restrictions on wiretaps from telephone calls to
transmissions of electronic data by computer. Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Congress
enacted the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Patriot Act). The Patriot Act modified portions of
numerous electronic communications laws, including the ECPA and FISA, expanding the
authority of federal law enforcement to combat terrorism.
But the ECPA only regulates the surveillance involves a human voice, and the FISA that may
regulate all electronic surveillance, including video surveillance, only applies to the "foreign
intelligence information" between or among "foreign powers." Thus, video surveillance falls
outside the range of either ECPA or FISA.
The prior statutes like ECPA do not cover public video surveillance, fundamentally, because
of the novelty of video surveillance and piecemeal implementations. Except some legislative
endeavors in state level before 9/11 attacks,163 only informal guidelines without legal binding
effect are published.
Most of those guidelines are provided by professional organizations. The Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) provides a rigorous certification process
for the national guidelines, which are published but have no binding legal effect. 164 The
Department of Justice has also issued policy guidelines for video surveillance by government
agencies. The guidelines note that the existing Federal Wiretap Act (Title III) does not control the
use of CCTV systems. They also notes that no than probable cause is needed when search warrants
permitting the use of video surveillance are requested.165 Notably, the guidelines focus primarily
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on a single camera which is used to monitor a target rather than pervasive public video surveillance
system. The American Bar Association developed a set of standards entitled “TechnologicallyAssisted Physical Surveillance.” The guidance calls for the coordination of law enforcement
efforts and collaboration with citizens. It also strongly recommends public meetings and the
development of administrative controls and protocols for the storage and release of images.166
Standard 2-9.3. Video surveillance
(a) Video surveillance of a private activity or condition is permissible when it complies
with provisions applicable to electronic interception of communications [see Standards 21.1 et seq. of this Chapter], as modified for video surveillance.
(b) Overt video surveillance for a protracted period not governed by Standard 2-9.3(a)
is permissible when:
(i) politically accountable law enforcement official or the relevant politically
accountable governmental authority concludes that the surveillance
(A) will not view a private activity or condition; and
(B) will be reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective; and
(ii) in cases where deterrence rather than investigation is the primary objective, the
public to be affected by the surveillance:
(A) is notified of the intended location and general capability of the camera; and
(B) has the opportunity, both prior to the initiation of the surveillance and periodically
during it, to express its views of the surveillance and propose changes in its execution,
through a hearing or some other appropriate means.
(c) All video surveillance not governed by Standard 2-9.3(a) or (b) is permissible when
a supervisory law enforcement official, or the surveilling officer when there are exigent
circumstances, concludes that the surveillance:
(i) Will not view a private activity or condition; and
(ii) Will be reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.167

Discussion
As an essential element of a free society, privacy is well recognized by the people both in the
United States and Britain. In addition, other commonly known legal, language, and cultural
similarities between Britain and the U.S. make the practice in Britain a good example from which
the United States could learn. As one law student Note has argued:
166
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The entire area of law pertaining to privacy rights in the United States and its invasion by
new technology is inadequate. Rather than waiting for the courts to try to catch up with
the technology, the United States should follow the United Kingdom's lead by enacting
new regulations and laws dealing with emerging technology.”168
Given those similarities, one might have expected that the United States would follow the
road explored by Britain. This part discusses reasons why, to the contrary, the legislative practice
in the United States is vastly different from that in Britain.
1. Different political structures and histories of privacy protection
It should not be forgotten that the right to privacy originated in the United States Constitution,
while the modern protection of privacy in Britain was just rooted in the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950.169 The United States has a
longer history of privacy protection than Britain does, and the level of protection is higher where
the Constitution is involved. Nonetheless, Britain has developed a system of comprehensive
legislation has been enacted to protect privacy over the past two decades, whereas protection in
the United States remains inconsistent and segregated. Thus, public video surveillance regulation
has been a focus of legislation in Britain, but largely outside the range of U.S. legislatures.
In the United States, the right to privacy was guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and later
amendments to the Constitution. It relates to the right of freedom of association, voting rights,
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right of information privacy, including
avoiding the disclosure of personal matters, and being independent in decision making. 170
Although the constitutional privacy right protects the individual against the State, state tort law
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steps in to protect against the action of other citizens. During the Great Depression, the federal
government began implementing increasingly broad legislation, but legislation which touched on
the right to privacy could be described as ad hoc, targeted at specific government agencies,
economic sectors or industries, and often addressed only to narrow and specific issues.171 Decades
later, in an attempt to unify an approach to protecting data, Congress enacted the Privacy Act of
1974,172 the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988,173 the Privacy Protection Act
of 1980,174 and the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.175 But this effort at uniformity failed:
“[B]ecause each of these statutes was limited to a specific area or sector, the resulting protection
for the individual was neither comprehensive nor consistent.”176
In the absence of a written constitution, the right to respect for private and family life in
Britain was first set out in Article 8 of the Europe Convention on Human Rights. The legislation
of privacy protection in Britain was one part of the big picture in Europe. To some extent, Europe's
experience in World War II was the hidden agenda behind the European data protection laws, and
“the desire to avoid a recurrence of the type of population control exercised by the Nazis and the
Gestapo.” 177 Then, the advent of technology drove the Council of Europe to begin “to study
potential courses for data protection legislation” to prevent privacy rights from being infringed.178
Once the Council of Ministers of the EU formally adopts a directive, it sets a deadline for member
states to transpose the directive to their own law.
Michael W. Heydrich, has sharply argued that, unlike Britain’s legislation driven by the
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uniform approach adopted by the EU, the United States’ use of patchwork of laws leads to
inconsistent and inadequate privacy protections:
The European emphasis is on the deterrence of harm and accomplishes this by instituting
the necessary control mechanisms for oversight. In contrast, the United States uses a
complex patchwork of laws (the Constitution, federal and state legislation, and state
common law) to address the right to privacy, taking a reactive stance by legislating in
narrow specific areas where problems have occurred. The U.S. emphasis is on use of
remedies for damage which has already taken place and prevents future harm by the threat
of legal action. This pivotal difference is best explained by providing a general overview
of the histories of privacy law in the United States and the countries of the European
Union.179
According to Heydrich, the difference seems to lie in the different attitudes in controlling video
surveillance, the use of prospective legislation in Britain versus the use of retrospective judicial
remedies in the United States.
But to read between the lines, it is actually federalism that best explains the difference in
the British and U.S. experiences. As is well known, in the United States principles of federalism
rooted in historical fear of a strong central government maintain a balance of power between the
states and the federal government. When Congress attempts to pass national uniform standards
regulating the public video surveillance, federalism operates as an important constraint. Because
“[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers,”180 Congress might not
directly have authority from the Constitution to create a federal statute to set up a uniform standard
of regulating public video surveillance, especially when some systems are operated locally. As a
result, the gap in legislation can only be filled by state legislations, informal organization
guidelines and so on. “Because of this patchwork method of privacy regulation, the United States
may never have an over-arching privacy statute.”181 In contrast, legislation in Britain faces no such
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federalism obstacle, and it is easier to create national-wide regulations. At the same time, the
European Union has strongly influenced member states like Britain to accept the uniform standards
adopted by the EU.
2. Different attitudes towards the expectation of privacy in public places
In the overview and guiding principle part of the POFA code 2012, the Surveillance Camera
Commissioner in Britain declared it is an accepted view that privacy might be interfered by the
“modern and forever advancing surveillance camera technology,”182 because there does exist some
expectation of privacy in public places from a developing perspective. The code announced that it
“must regulate that potential (to intrude on the right to respect for private and family life), now
and in the future.”183
In considering the potential to interfere with the right to privacy, it is important to take
account of the fact that expectations of privacy are both varying and subjective. In general
terms, one of the variables is situational, and in a public place there is a zone of interaction
with others which may fall within the scope of private life.184
This attitude of evolving expectations of privacy has not been affirmed in the United States.
Although scholars and judges have long realized that pervasive video surveillance could
dramatically transform the expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court has not yet taken a crucial
step to close this argument. Some scholars have indicated that the mass surveillance has created a
National Surveillance State, in which the focus is on preventing criminality ex ante, as opposed to
prosecuting crime ex post.185 Others have warned about mass surveillance and data collection by
the state could threaten personal freedom of association and the right to speak anonymously.186
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Judges have recognized the problem for a relatively long time. In United States v. Garcia,187
the Seventh Circuit concluded that GPS monitoring of a single suspect without a warrant does not
amount to “wholesale surveillance.” But Judge Posner quickly followed,
Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance
that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive . . . . Should government
someday decide to institute a program of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it
will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to
treat such surveillance as a search.188
Similarly, one year later, in Jones, Justice Alito acknowledged “the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”189
Yet neither the lower federal courts nor the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine to address the issue involving the jurisprudence of
privacy right in public places.
3. The effects of 9/11
Another important difference between the British and American experience relates to the
9/11 attacks, and to the timing of efforts to regulate public surveillance. By the end of 1990s,
Britain had already adopted a series of privacy and data protection laws prompted by
encouragement from the European Union. Had that process continued uninterrupted, the practice
in EU might gradually have come influence the U.S. practice under the international “ripple effect”
because of the globalization of privacy issues, driven by rising worldwide communication, trade,
travel, and marketing activities. In fact, “policy debates in 1997–2000 included sharp discussions
of whether the United States should adopt the EU mode.”190
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Indeed, public attention about public surveillance systems had also begun to emerge in the
U.S. during the 1990s. Professor Alan Furman Westin has argued that 1990–2002 was “the period
when privacy became a first-level social and political issue in the United States.” 191 Privacy
debates in America during this period responded to several technological developments, such as
the rise of the Internet, the arrival of wireless communication devices, the Human Genome
Project's unlocking of the genetic code, etc. According to Professor Westin, two of those
technologies bore a close relationship with surveillance: “the development of data-mining software
based on large data warehousing applications, along with further automation of government public
record systems,” 192 and the private use of encryption tools that federal law enforcement and
national security agencies sought to block out of concern that “strong encryption programs could
immunize online communications by drug dealers and terrorists from lawful surveillance.” 193
Those emerging technologies were increasing the public concerns about the privacy.
As Westin explains, there was a stream of more than 120 national surveys in that decade
gauging public attitudes toward privacy either wholly or in significant part. He thought those
surveys not only raised the public concerns on the privacy, but also resulted in a sound basis for
formulating public policies on privacy.
For politicians watching polls and media trends, it was clear by 2000 that championing
privacy protection was now very good politics. At the state level, hundreds of new
consumer privacy laws were enacted each year in 2000 and 2001, with coalitions of
Republican and Democratic political leaders uniting to reflect the privacy concerns of
suburbanites, women, Internet users, and other desirable local constituencies.194
Suddenly, the attacks of September 11, 2001, drastically changed the privacy protection
process. The war against terrorism catalyzed the surveillance expansion. On one hand, public panic
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fueled calls for more video cameras on the streets, which is assumed to make the streets safer. A
survey done shortly after the 9/11 attack recorded very high public approval of new governmental
investigative powers. Among them, up to 86% approved facial-recognition technology to scan for
terrorists at public events and places.195 Although a repeat survey one year later showed that some
parts of the high support fell, the support for stronger surveillance and law enforcement measures
continues196. 58% continued to support extended camera surveillance on streets and in public
places. 197 Politicians were happy to oblige by expanding surveillance systems as the public
apparently demanded.

Ⅳ. A Comparative Perspective on the Structure of the Executive
Branch and Regulations of Video Surveillance

The absence of regulations from the judicial and legislative branches leaves the burden of
relieving the tension between security and privacy on the executive branch, especially the police
department, the most prominent daily user of public video surveillance. Thus, self-restraint and
self-regulations by the executive branch might be the last chance of the government to safeguard
privacy interests and remain accountable to the public.
This part primarily compares the U.S. administrative practice with that in China. Those
comparisons basing on two pairings of factors: vertical/horizontal and internal/external. By
“vertical” and “horizontal,” I distinguish between the central government control and the
stakeholders’ influence at the local level. By “internal” and “external,” I distinguish between
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effectiveness analysis and the public attitude analysis.
An analysis of those factors leads to the interesting finding that public participation is more
necessary in the United States than in China because of different political structures. In an
authoritative country, where the executive branch is dominant and local governments are under
strict central control and supervision from higher authorities, it does not matter whether
governments could get public support on a particular public issue. Administrative regulations
could still run smoothly or effectively without adequate public participation. But in a democratic
society, public participation is essential not only in justifying particular administrative decisions,
but also in keeping the executive branch on the right track.

A. Administrative Regulations in Different Countries
As discussed above, the global rush to install public video surveillance has been carried out
with little systematic attention to the evaluation of those systems,198 and often with no adequate
regulations. Even in systems not subject to meaningful judicial or legislative oversight, however,
there are often administrative regulations that govern the operation of the system, and those
regulations differ depending on the national context. The basic form of such regulations are
guidelines or codes of practice:
Typically, these codes lay down guidelines for the daily operation of the schemes, and
cover matters such as staffing, tape handling and storage procedures, security and access
to the scheme, and the control and operation of the cameras. Some codes may also include
a statement of the purpose and objectives of the scheme, as well as a set of ‘rules’ designed
to protect the public against unwarranted or intrusive surveillance.199
In the United States, each police department operating public video surveillance has its own
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guidelines. 200 These administrative guidelines are different from those informal guidelines
published by professional organizations, but obviously the former borrows provisions from the
latter. In Britain, apart from the Data Protection Act and other legislative regulations, various
administrative regulations limit the use of CCTV, among these, the written codes of practice now
widely used by the police.201 Although a study in 1995 showed “the codes varied considerably in
terms of their content, style, and length,” considerable efforts have been made by the Home Office
and various CCTV user groups to provide some sort of guidance as to best practice, such as “A
Watching Brief: A Code of Practice for CCTV” by the Local Government Information Unit in 1996
(LGIU Model), and the Model Code of Practice based on the LGIU model, written by the police
and made available to all of the schemes in the Southern Region. 202 In China, The National
Development and Reform Commission, Central comprehensive management office, Ministry of
industry and information technology, Ministry of public security et al. published “Several Opinions
on Increasing Efforts to Establish and Network Public Security Video Surveillance” in May 2015,
set up a nationwide goal for the implementation, management and regulations of public video
surveillance.
By 2020, will have established and applied networked public video security surveillance,
essentially bringing about "full coverage, full network sharing, full-time availability”, and
achieving visible success in areas such as strengthening public security prevention and
control, optimizing transportation, servicing urban management, and innovating social
management.203
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Administrative regulations in the operational level can organize and coordinate facilityrelated and human-related aspects of CCTV, which may influence the effectiveness of the system
to a great extent.204 A recent study that analyzed CCTV systems in three U.S. cities, Baltimore,
Chicago, and Washington, DC, concluded that the more the system is incorporated into routine law
enforcement tactics, the more effectively it may reduce crime. 205 Furthermore, the guidelines
published by the police department can address privacy issues as well. A set of rules for routine
work could be designed to prevent abuses and to protect the public from the most intrusive aspects
of the system.

B. Structural Differences Matter
Similar to China, where public video surveillance cameras are also vastly installed, the United
States has relied greatly on the self-restraint of administrative agencies. But due to different
political contexts between China and the United States, the relatively uniform, efficient and selfadjusting administrative experience in China may not be fit for the democratic society of the United
States. Although the U.S. political system has an affinity with the British political system, the
specific traits of U.S. political context has led the practice of regulations to a different path. This
part examines two pairs of factors, vertical/horizontal and internal/external, to explain those
differences.
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Central control analysis (vertical factor)
The force of the central control may lead to the promulgation of relatively uniform guidelines.
In a centralized political system, like China, the central government not only controls resource
allocation, but also sets up uniform rules for the whole country. As a result, in the field of public
video surveillance, local policies and codes of practice must follow the instructions from the higher
authority. In the decentralized political systems like Britain, Australia and the United States, by
contrast, local governments are more likely to choose their own guidelines. Thus in the democratic
society, the federal government sometimes use the funding method in attempt to induce local
governments keep pace with federal priorities.
Federal or central funding for the local deployment of public video surveillance systems is a
global practice. In Australia, the $65.5 million Howard Government funding scheme dubbed “The
National Community Crime Prevention Program” (NCCPP) was a major initiative that began in
2004 and ended in 2008 after five rounds of funding. More rounds have since been offered under
successive governments.206 In Britain, government funding took the form of the CCTV Challenge
Competition between 1994 and 1999. During this period, £38.5 million was made available for
some 585 schemes nationwide. Between 1999 and 2003, major investment was made in public
CCTV through the Home Office-funded Crime Reduction Program (CRP). Following a bidding
process, a total of £170 million of capital funding was made available to local authorities. As a
result of this funding, more than 680 CCTV schemes were installed.207 The situation in the United
States is much more complicated and secretive. But there is no doubt that for the past few years
the local governments have received millions of dollars from the federal government through the
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Department of Homeland Security grants, even though no exact amount of funding has been
disclosed. According to some public available information, “the federal government has spent tens
of millions of dollars on Chicago's camera network.”208 Journalists have discovered that “St. Paul,
got a $1.2 million grant for 60 cameras for downtown; Madison, Wis., is buying a 32-camera
network with a $388,000 grant; and Pittsburgh, is adding 83 cameras to its downtown with a $2.58
million grant.”209 DHS grants even seems to be flowing down to the smallest levels of American
law enforcement, bringing Surveillance Cameras to small towns.210
The Home Office in Britain has successfully used the funding to influence local practice. A
prior study found that the CCTV policy arena has been dominated by central government. Because
the impetus for CCTV emanated from central government, the Home Office has endeavored to
standardize and centralize technological provision in the local level to meet central government
objectives.211 The CCTV Challenge Competition grants funding to the local government with some
requirements such as local matched funding from partnerships and the draft codes of practice. This
bidding process is competitive. In the first competition in 1994, the Home Office received bids for
480 schemes, and although the government contribution increased to £5 million, only 106 were
funded. In response to the huge demand, there were three further City Challenge Competitions
announced between 1995 and 1998. And the central funding took up a big part as up to £31 million
in the total £85 million funding of CCTV systems.212 The central control through a competitive
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bidding process not only encouraged the deployment and stimulated demand beyond that which
could be funded,213 but also spurred the widespread adoption of codes by the police and local
authorities because bids without codes of practice draft would fail. Applicants therefore rushed to
adopt codes of practice. Without any experience in this field, applicants commonly borrowed from
the national model code initiated by the Home Office. Since the vast majority of public CCTV
schemes in Britain have entered the Challenge Competition at least once, the vast majority of
systems now have similar codes of practice.
In the United States, by contrast, virtually no centralization of surveillance regulations has
occurred. First, there are no national statistics about the federal grants on local public video
surveillance programs. No single category in DHS grants is designed for the cameras. The
spokesman of DHS, Russ Knocke, said that it is difficult to say how much money has been spent
on surveillance cameras because many grants awarded to states or cities contained money for
cameras and other equipment. 214 Second, there has been a great deal of secrecy regarding the
funding process, which makes the research on the central control impossible and any estimation
or presumption is vague and unreliable. Matthew Cagle of the ACLU of Northern California
explains,
Like the federal intelligence community's black budget, which allows our federal
government to allocate billions of taxpayer dollars for spying, all without public debate,
these federal grants to local communities also distort the democratic process and prevent
a meaningful discussion of the relative costs and benefits of surveillance technology.215
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Third, DHS grants are controversial because they aim to use federal funds to “br[ing] resources
and expertise to our law enforcement partners and built new mechanisms to share information,”216
prompting concerns about converting local police departments and sheriff’s offices into “partners”
with a massive and lawless federal agency. As a result, some resistance appeared from residents
that would be the targets of pervasive public video surveillance. Iowa City imposed a moratorium
on some surveillance devices. The Seattle City Council forced its police department to return a
federally financed drone to the manufacturer. In Virginia, the state’s attorney general said the
method of collecting and saving the license plates data collected by cameras violated state law,
and the state police purged a database of millions of license plates, including some at political
rallies. Even a cash-starved city like Oakland, for which federal financing is very attractive, was
forced to add restrictions to its program following a public outcry after the city council approved
a surveillance program. The council instructed public officials to write a policy detailing what kind
of data could be collected and protected, and how it could be used. The council expects the privacy
policy to be ready before the center can start operations.217
Stakeholder analysis (horizontal factor)
Stakeholders involved at the local level may influence the content and process of amending
guidelines.

Video surveillance programs affect a whole host of government, commercial,

organizational, and individual interests, and the shape of administrative regulations depends in
large part on which stakeholders wield the greatest amount of influence. As an illustration of
stakeholders in U.S. jurisdictions, consider the city of Pittsburgh’s CCTV implementation, which
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initially identified 18 different stakeholders that would be affected by the deployment of a
sophisticated public surveillance system. 218 More self-identified stakeholders were revealed
during the process.219 Some stakeholders are similar both in the United States and China, including
the users of the system, the Mayor, the public safety officials and the vendor. But a large number
of stakeholders in China do not have a comparable role in the United States, such as the community
groups, the city council and the civil liberties groups.
(1) Police department
As extremely import stakeholders in both countries, public safety officials in China may play
an even more dominant role in the administrative process than their U.S. counterparts. In every
corner of the world where public video surveillance is deployed, police departments are
undoubtedly the key participants not only in the implementation stage, but also in managing and
using the system. In addition, public video surveillance can powerfully influence police officers’
behavior.220 In the implementing stage, police departments find surveillance systems attractive for
three reasons highlighted by scholars.
First, the specialization of services in charge of the management of CCTV and / or
viewing the resulting images made [police] new professional allies of CCTV
development. Then, symbolic rewards that can be derived from the use of CCTV
contributed to the enrolment of stakeholders such as municipal police officers, delighted
to integrate a “detective” dimension into their daily work, bringing them closer to criminal
City of Pgh Housing Authority to use City cameras; Hospitals to rent hospital roof-tops for antennas; Board of
Education to use City cameras; Universities to use City cameras; Central Business District to use City cameras for
Security & events; Mayor to protect City from crime; City Council to protect City neighborhoods from crime;
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investigation, which would normally be the responsibility of the National, not Municipal,
Police. Lastly, the National Police force appreciated the ‘cost-free’ resource of CCTV,
using a device they do not have to finance but according their own professional priorities:
law enforcement or criminal investigation in particular.221
Police departments are also the main user of video surveillance systems. In 2014 at the China
Smart City Innovation Conference, the chief engineer of the Technology and Information Bureau
of the Ministry of Public Security, Zhu Fugang, revealed based on incomplete statistics that China's
public security organs have used video surveillance service nearly 42 million times, and served the
people nearly 10 million times in 2013.222
Administrative guidelines’ functional provisions, such as limiting public video surveillance,
creating operational procedures and regulating police officers’ behavior, are mostly published by
the police department itself. But the degree of freedom police departments enjoy in crafting those
regulations depends on their institutional strength. A relatively weak, politically dependent police
department may be accountable to a wide range of stakeholders as it designs guidelines..

By

contrast, a powerful and independent police department, subject to little external influence, only
needs to follow its own internal rules, which are presumed to meet the department’s interest to the
utmost extent.
The institutional strength of police departments is another point of distinction between
Chinese political practice and that of the United States. “China has a one-party political system, a
tradition of centralized government, and a highly politicized and centralized police structure,”223
Germain S, Dumoulin L, Douillet A C. A prosperous ‘business’. The success of CCTV through the eyes of
international literature. 11(1/2) SURVEILLANCE & SOCVE, 134,143 (2013).
221

222

Gong 2 Bu Jiang Jiada Shipin Jiankong Xitong Fugai Huo Quan Hangye Dailai Lihao.(公安部将加大视频监控

系统覆盖或全行业带来利好)[The Ministry of Public Security will enhance the coverage of CCTV, may benefit the
whole industry], Zhengquan Shibao Wang (证券时报网), Nov. 7, 2014,
http://kuaixun.stcn.com/2014/1107/11835126.shtml. (China).
223
Cao L, Hou C, A comparison of confidence in the police in China and in the United States, 29(2) J. CRIM. JUS.,
87 (2001).

65

however, “the U.S. has a predominantly two-party political system, a tradition of federal
government, and a multilevel and often fragmented police structure.”224
In China, the police department is a special department in the government. The renowned
Chinese scholar, Professor Chen Xingliang explains that in China the police department holds vast
and important power, not only undertaking the criminal justice function, but also performing a
variety of administrative management functions, including security, road traffic management, fire
supervision, Census Management and so on. Its authority is powerful and can influence every facet
of the society.225 One sign of that power is the position of the police chief in the local government
structure. At the provincial, municipal, and county levels, the police chief also simultaneously
serves the deputy of the government at the same time. Thus, the police department plays dominant
role in the decision-making process, especially in the fields relevant to the public safety and social
control. Barely none could question its authority. When local police departments follow the
instruction from their higher authority to deploy and use public video surveillance, they often get
absolute support from the local government and encounter few obstacles as long as the funding
can be arranged. After the demand of the police department was accepted by the local government,
a committee would be set up to coordinate various relevant departments, which would simply obey
the unified plan for the project. Thus, the government-owned camera systems in China are
essentially a product of police self-construction.226
On the other hand, the U.S. police departments must compromise far more often in light of
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the many stakeholders involved, including a multitude of neighborhood groups, community
organizations, and businesses that maintain or might desire to install independent surveillance
systems. In Pittsburgh’s case study, the surveillance system committee, comprised of different
groups that represented many varying interests, believed that all possible stakeholders had been
considered. But one unexpected stakeholder appeared, the Fraternal Order of Police (police union)
even demanded a voice in the deployment plan just because they were afraid of the potential for
the City to use surveillance to continuously scrutinize the police force and constantly conduct
video review of the police officer’s conduct in the field.227
(2) The vendor
The fact that vendors of video surveillance products can influence the decision to install
systems was revealed in early studies in Britain, which showed that “the open-street CCTV was
the result of a strategic alliance between local government and local economic interests.” 228
Similarly, in China, a study stated that public video surveillance has become a money-earning tool
for some enterprises and local governments.229 But spurring the implementation of a system is one
thing; influencing the regulations is another. Currently, both in China and the United States, the
CCTV industry’s direct or indirect impact on the regulations adopted by the executive branches
has not been fully studied. Nonetheless, it is safe to estimate that this factor may play a modest
role in administrative regulations in both countries. After successfully lobbying government to
install the system, the only work left for the vendor is to meet the specific demands of the
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government based on the available technologies in the regulating context. Thus, vendors have
fewer motives to influence the operational and administrative practice in the post-deployment
stage than to influence the legislation. But we have to acknowledge that commercial interests may
still have some influence on executive self-regulation, even though the evidence is limited.
(3) City Council and civil liberties groups
With the dominant police department and the supportive local government behind, there is
little room left to other stakeholders in China. In particular, there is no room for the City Council
or civil liberties groups, both of which play a significant part in the formation of privacy policy in
the United States. Before the decision to start the project in the U.S., the privacy policy would be
presented to City Council for approval. Developing a draft policy in Pittsburgh took approximately
nine months, and during that period the City held public fact-finding meetings with all identified
stakeholders, including industry experts and representatives from various community and civil
liberties groups, to discuss the nuances and feasibility of the proposed policy.230 The development
of codes of conduct in Britain follows a similar pattern. The ongoing work of civil liberties groups
appears to have had a considerable impact on the thinking and priorities of the police and local
authorities regarding the use of CCTV and the need for regulation.231 It has been also instrumental
in drawing the attention of the public to the need for greater control and regulation of this
technology.232
Effectiveness analysis (internal factor)
As discussed in Part I, the research by scholars has raised considerable concern about the

230

Mu, supra note 227, at 60.

231

GOOLD, supra note 199, at 102.
232
Id.
68

effectiveness of video surveillance. That research could help to inform the objectives the system
aims to achieve. The findings that the CCTV is more effective in one setting than others may also
help answer questions like, how many cameras are needed and where? Research on the costs of
surveillance systems may prompt the consideration of other possible alternatives.
No government can avoid addressing considerations of effectiveness, which play a big role
in justifying monitoring, but there are important differences in the way that policymakers in China
and the United States evaluate effectiveness. The first difference concerns the content of the
effectiveness considerations. Governments in the United States focus mainly on effectiveness in
combatting crime and terrorism, as reflected in the NYPD guidelines and in the sources of funding
for these programs. Two scholars, Rajiv Shah and Jeremy Braithwaite, have identified two
dominant justifications for cameras have emerged in the United States. One is for police
investigations where cameras are used to solve crimes after they occurred. The other for cameras
is reducing or preventing crime.233 In China, by contrast, the implementation of the Golden Shield
Project places more emphasis on the sociological processes to create a national surveillance.
Walton reports that the project was launched:
to promote "the adoption of advanced information and communication technology to
strengthen central police control, responsiveness, and crime combating capacity, so as to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police work." China’s security apparatus
announced an ambitious plan: to build a nationwide digital surveillance network, linking
national, regional and local security agencies with a panoptic web of surveillance. Beijing
envisions the Golden Shield as a database-driven remote surveillance system – offering
immediate access to records on every citizen in China, while linking to vast networks of
cameras designed to increase police efficiency.234
Interestingly, a second difference in how U.S. and Chinese officials evaluate effectiveness
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lies in the timing of when governments consider it. The United States prefers ex ante analysis while
the China likes ex post analysis, and that difference has shaped the development of surveillance
systems in the two countries.
The U.S. executive branch generally prefers to conduct cost-benefit analysis before engaging
in a new project. Local public video surveillance advocates therefore need to persuade the City
Council, the public and various partnerships and stakeholders that there is imminent necessity to
set up public video surveillance in the name of public safety. For example,
The city of Chicago claims cameras have reduced crime. Specifically, cameras reduced
serious index crimes by 17% in the monitored areas. Overall, the police claimed a drop
of 30% in crime in the 234 areas where cameras were located. The cameras were also
touted as a significant factor in reducing homicides 25% between 2003 and 2004. As a
result, the Chicago experience has provided the imprimatur of effectiveness for largescale camera networks. Other cities such as Baltimore and New York use the Chicago
experience to justify additional cameras.235
However, in the starting stage, Chinese police departments generally do not consider the
effectiveness of the system as much as their U.S. counterparts. The benefits of surveillance
programs cited by proponents are in general terms, and often lack supportive evidence. But that
would not be an obstacle in China, where effectiveness evaluation does not occur until after
implementation. And even then, the process may be distorted due to “the objective management
and the performance assessment,” which pervades the administrative departments throughout the
whole country. “The objective management and the performance assessment” is conducted by the
superior departments to evaluate their subordinate organs based on several indexes set up by
themselves. The installing, operating and using of public video surveillance were some of the
indexes that formed part of the assessment. As a result, the deployment of public video surveillance
started before any meaningful and systematic evaluation of its effectiveness.
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In China, one key index to evaluate whether the system has functioned properly lies in a
mechanism called “Typical Case Reporting System.” A monthly quota is set up by the high
authority, asking the operators to report typical cases in which the public video surveillance system
plays a part—for example, to help investigate criminal cases, to help keep social order, to monitor
traffic violations or to provide any other valuable information. Operators have to collect the
complete information about the events relevant to the use of cameras, and submit them to the
higher authority along with video or pictures distilled from the surveillance system. These typical
cases are then selected and used by the higher authority to meet department objectives or to
publicize what the police have done to reduce crimes and protect people. 236 The typical case
reporting system is the primary mechanism by which departments take the effectiveness into
consideration. If a local police department has met the quota of “typical cases,” public video
surveillance there will be taken as an effective tool for the police to use.
Objectively speaking, this ex post administrative evaluation of the performance of the
operators and users does somehow spur the operational work and encourage the use of this system,
which will help the system accomplish effectiveness in a long run. According to publicly available
reports, the police departments in Shanxi Province had successfully used the public video
surveillance in 13,321 cases in 2014, including 1,655 criminal cases. Meanwhile, the total number
of the cameras in the public places has increased to 148,631 feeds in the whole province.237 Within
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the Huanpu district of Guangzhou, where 16,000 feeds have been installed, there were 703 criminal
cases with the video surveillance assistance in 2014. The number of cases directly or indirectly
using the cameras take up 57.7% in the total number of detected cases.238 But in practice, these
fancy numbers which are used to prove the effectiveness one of systems in particular precincts
should be discounted. Operators trying to meet their quota, a task which could eventually influence
their performance evaluation and income, could retrospectively apply the cameras. For example,
one empirical study recounted a case in which an operator used video data in the system to illustrate
that how a crime was detected. But in fact, the operator had followed the clues to find the video
out after the police had detected that crime by other measures.239
The public attitude analysis (external factor)
A final factor to consider is public opinion, as distinguished from the views of specific
individual stakeholders. Political science defines public opinion as “the aggregate of public
attitudes or beliefs about government or politics.”240 Those dynamic attitudes have the power to
influence the government. Civil liberties groups who are stakeholders may be taken as the
representatives of the public, but they cannot replace the public, for whom the government acts
and whose views should be respected.
Analyses of public opinion on public video surveillance have produced mixed results, and
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may be hampered by methodologically questionable social surveys.241 However, studies that have
measured levels of support for CCTV have shown a clear and strong public support among most
countries.
Studies in Britain in 1992 and in 2005 found that public support for CCTV remains high.242
The report in 2005 presented the people’s attitude to CCTV in 12 areas. It showed 82% of the
respondents, who had no prior knowledge and experience of CCTV in their area, were happy with
CCTV being installed. The finding in town and city centers also mirrored that for residential areas.
At the same time, the public remained unaware of the capabilities of CCTV, even as they expected
it was having an impact on crime in their residential area. 243
A comparative survey from Canada and the USA found that people far more confident about
the effectiveness of camera surveillance than are researchers on the topic. For example, in 2006
and 2012, the U.S. remained at a steady 71% in the belief in effectiveness for community CCTV.244
Researchers found that result discouraging: “they are more knowledgeable about the technologies
and that they have a say over their data-travels but fewer actually know about laws governing
personal data and, for those who use them, their preferred modes of self-protection vary
considerably.”245
In China, there is no published research providing any number about the public attitude
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towards the public video surveillance. Just according to a field research in which the author of this
paper took part in 2012, the survey showed that 93.7% (including very supportive and fairly
supportive)of 478 people in two middle-class counties supported the public surveillance system.246
Why do people support a project that they do not fully understand? This question raised some
scholars’ interest, and some of their findings point to the media’s role in shaping public acceptance
of cameras. Mass media, after all, benefit from video surveillance systems. The images captured
by surveillance cameras can make the news seem more authentic and vivid. Thus, the media
becomes one part of the loop that encourages the expansion of video surveillance systems. As the
gatekeepers of the system who can get access to the images, the police department could choose
to provide information to the media when doing so is in the department’s interest. Images of crime
shown on television news programming could increase the public anxiety of the risk of crimes.
Anxiety, in turn, spurs more calls for further extension of public video surveillance systems that
lead to more crime events being captured on video and played on the media.247 For the news media
covering the system, the cameras are seen as friendly eyes, leaving the effectiveness and legitimacy
of the system unquestioned:
Since the early 1990s, CCTV has spread out visibly into the public realm, and cameras
are now connected to public efforts to combat crime, which means they have achieved a
public value that is immediately reflected in the media. Yet, especially in the UK, any
critical debate seemed to be banned from the beginning.248
In other words, before CCTV became a reality of everyday life it first of all became a part
of news stories and nationwide television shows.249
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In addition, Rachel L. Finn and Michael McCahill have argued that media portrayals of
surveillance “continue to reinforce existing social divisions by marking out clear distinctions
between ‘us’ (law abiding citizens) and ‘them’ (‘deviants’ and ‘outgroups’).” 250 The public is
depicted as a group of law abiding citizens who will “put up with” increasing levels of surveillance
in order to get security and safety. To dissent in terms of increasing the amount of CCTV cameras
would put people on the side of “them.”251
Aside from the media, there are several other possible explanations for high levels of public
support. A leading surveillance expert, Professor David Lyon, argues that individuals rarely feel
oppressed by the surveillance by the powers, noting that a majority will even actively collaborate
by giving personal data, considering the benefits to be higher than the cost.252 Professor Didier
Bigo proposed a notion, the “ban-opticon,” 253 which indicates only the few profiled as
“unwelcome” are monitored by a few, to alternate the “panopticon”254 and “synopticon.”255 The
ban-opticon stresses exceptional cases, including the exclusion of certain groups, the
exceptionalism of power and the production of normative imperatives within post 9/11 discussions.
What makes the ban-opticon especially interesting is that “the visibility of exclusion vanishes,
while the power of exception and the production of normative imperatives amalgamate into a
‘governmentality’ of uncertainty, unease, fear and (in)security.”256 Meanwhile, Professor Gary T.
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Marx has characterized new surveillance as having a tendency to become abstract. This abstract
character of new surveillance almost invalidates opposition.257 Both the exception and the abstract
character of surveillance result in an expectation that nobody (including the judges) asks for the
legitimacy and the efficiency after a certain period of time.
The high-level public support and low-level doubt on the legitimacy and efficiency of public
video surveillance do not mean the governments can do whatever they want, especially in a
democratic society where the people’s political beliefs value freedom.
In China, the government may obtain the political trust through other measures, like cultural
factors. Chinese scholar Ma Deyong explains that “[i]n a country with a history of autocratic or
authoritarian rule, people's trust in government is not only based on the government's performance,
but also on people's worship of authority and dependence.” 258 Thus, the people may take the
government’s specific decisions on public video surveillance issues for granted as long as they
have been told that all of those are to protect them. Furthermore, according to a study, Chinese
people are less concerned about privacy right for three main reasons: the long tradition of
collectivism that trumps individualism, the tight control by the government and close scrutiny of
citizens, and the average crowded living environment where private space is not generally
expected.259
Those cultural factors do not have the same force in the United States. Instead, rational choice
theory is a starting point of the theoretical analysis of the causes of political trust in western
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countries. The people can be presumed as reasonable individuals with rational judgments. 260
Citizens care about their freedom and privacy right with a relatively longer history of privacy
protection, so there can be always concerns about encroachment on civil liberties. Besides, the
public participation is always one of key elements in the democracy. All of these result in a
necessity for the democratic government to involve public participation in the decision-making
process as fully as possible.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

As a democratic and free country, the United States might have gone on a different path
regarding regulating public video surveillance, either from Britain with its similar political system
or from China with a totally different one. The three branches of government in the U.S. are
deadlocked and unable to take any meaningful actions. The Supreme Court, which is in a strong
position to set national and uniform standards for privacy protection, has not found a way to break
away from its own precedents. The legislative branch can do little on the national level regulations
due to federalism and the distribution of law enforcement activities at the state and local level.
Local legislative efforts might be helpful, but the process in each place will be complicated by
concerns about public security, the interests of industry, and politicians’ imperative to take visible
actions like video surveillance to fight against crimes and protect people, especially in the post9/11 context. The executive branch might be the weakest point in the deadlock because it already
bears responsibility for resolving tensions between privacy and safety. As the main advocates for
and daily users of the system, police departments must make rules for the purpose of manage
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complex surveillance systems and to avoid arbitrariness.
In the absence of action by the judicial and the legislative branches, self-restraint by the
executive branch has become crucial in determining the actual privacy protection the people can
obtain under pervasive video surveillance. Without the ordinary forms of judicial and legislative
oversight, the possibility of abuse by the executive branch may increase. Also, unlike China, the
United States’ local governments are not accountable to a single national authority. They must be
accountable to the people. As a result, the public participation in the United States is more
necessary in the decision-making process regarding public video surveillance.
Public opinion remains supportive of public video surveillance systems due to complicated
and intertwined factors. People are worried about the safety and security, and the mass media
exaggerates the effectiveness of the system in preventing crimes or terrorism. The public are not
well informed privacy issues brought by video surveillance. The executive branch uses the risk
that criminals might take advantage of surveillance information as an excuse, refusing to disclose
even basic information about the system, such as the funding sources, the total number and location
of cameras, etc., not to mention any incidents that have invaded people’s rights. But ample research
has demonstrated that the crime-prevention effectiveness of public surveillance is doubtful. And
the practice in China that the police department initially publish the typical cases can help relieve
the concern that this kind of information could be illegally used by the criminals.
These doubts about effectiveness do not inevitably lead to a conclusion that public video
surveillance is useless and should be abandoned. There have been a lot of studies showing that
public video surveillance is not only about the ability to prevent and detect crime, just like Clive
Norris stated: “It is about the power to watch, to deploy, to intervene, to identify and to regulate,
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often through exclusion…it concerns the reproduction of order.”261 The new functions need new
justifications to balance the privacy danger, at the same time, the adequate regulations are also
needed to keep the threats to privacy at the minimum.
Back to 2008, the Home Affairs Committee in Britain rejected “crude characterizations of
our society as a surveillance society.” It drew a line to define the surveillance society. As long as
trust in the government’s intentions in relation to data and data sharing is preserved, the society
could not be described as a surveillance society even there are trends of automatization, function
creep and integration of surveillance systems.262 Indeed, this statement could be seen as a call for
visibility and vocalization. If the government wants to meet its accountability promise to the
public, it has to initially disclose the information about the system and to involve more public
participation in the deployment, management and usage stages. After all, the public support is the
key in the democratic society.
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